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THE HOLLOW PROMISE OF FREEDOM
OF CONSCIENCE
Nadia N. Sawicki*
ABSTRACT
Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson asserted that no law
"ought to be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of con-
science against the enterprises of the civil authority." Since then, freedom
of conscience has continued to be heralded as a fundamental principle of
American society. Indeed, many current policy debates-most notably in
the medical and military contexts-are predicated on the theory that
claims of conscience are worthy of legal respect. This Article, which offers
a comprehensive account of the contemporary treatment of conscience,
challenges established assumptions and seeks to reframe the debate about
the normative value of conscience in American society.
This Article first clarifies contemporary understandings of conscience
by systematically analyzing its treatment in positive law. It looks beyond
the traditional medical, military, and religious contexts, giving a descrip-
tive account of law's treatment of conscience across various substantive
realms, including tax evasion, civil disobedience, discrimination, and even
violent terrorism. It demonstrates that legal accommodations are typically
granted on an ad hoc basis, without a guiding doctrinal principle. If there
is a consistent and coherent justification for treating cases differently, our
legal system has thus far failed to provide it.
This Article concludes that, in order for American law to reflect the
kind of robust, autonomy-based respect for conscience to which every
pluralistic society aspires, we must agree on a content-neutral guiding
principle for negotiating future claims for legal accommodation. The al-
ternative, the Article posits, is to concede that American society has aban-
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doned the fundamental purpose of conscientious accommodation-
namely, protecting the individual from oppressive majoritarian under-
standings of morality.
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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of conscience has long been touted as a fundamental
principle of a pluralistic society. Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jeffer-
son asserted that no law "ought to be dearer to man than that which
protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil au-
thority."I Since that time, courts and legislatures have continued to hold
conscience in high regard, most notably in justifying military exemp-
tions for conscientious objectors, granting legal accommodations for
physicians who refuse to perform controversial medical procedures, and
addressing the sub-category of conscience claims that is expressly based
on religious belief and analyzed under the First Amendment. Indeed,
contemporary philosopher John Rawls has described liberty of con-
science as "one of the fixed points of our considered judgments of jus-
tice,"2 and many current policy debates are predicated on the theory
that claims of conscience are worthy of legal respect.
Although the principle of freedom of conscience seems to do sig-
nificant theoretical work in these debates, we know very little about how
American law treats claims of conscience as a whole.3 Some of the most
compelling contemporary work in this area has focused on discrete cat-
egories of conscientious objection, such as claims by medical providers,4
military personnel,5 and the like.6 In bringing these threads together,7
I Thomas Jefferson, To the Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church at New London,
Connecticut (Feb. 4, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 147 (H.A. Washington
ed., 1854).
2 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 206 (1971).
3 One reason for this may be that contemporary legal discussions of conscience tend to be
subsumed by religion and constitutionalism. See, for example, the recent San Diego Law Review
Symposium titled Freedom of Conscience: Stranger in a Secular Land, which focused in large
part on the connection between respect for religion and respect for conscience. See Larry Alex-
ander & Steven D. Smith, Introduction to the 2010 Editors' Symposium: Freedom of Conscience:
Stranger in a Secular Land, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 899 (2010).
4 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Boozang, Developing Public Policy for Sectarian Providers: Accom-
modating Religious Beliefs and Obtaining Access to Care, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90 (1996);
Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the Eroding Moral Market-
place, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 83 (2006); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience:
Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41 (2008).
5 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious
Objection, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 31; Joseph B. Mackey, Reclaiming the In-Service Conscientious
Objection Program: Proposals for Creating a Meaningful Limitation to the Claim of Conscien-
tious Objection, 2008 ARMY LAW. 31.
6 Other discrete examples include conscience in personal associations, see generally
ROBERT K. VISCHER, Voluntary Associations, in CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RE-
CLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 125 (2009); conscience in legal practice, see
generally David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2010); ROBERT K.
VISCHER, The Legal Profession, in CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD supra, at 269; and
conscience and religion, see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN
DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008); Kent Greenawalt, Moral
2012] 1391
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this Article seeks to clarify the contemporary legal understanding of
conscience and reframe the debate about the normative value of con-
science in American society. As the scope of possible claims expands
beyond the traditional claims law has already grappled with, and as
more groups seek to negotiate legal accommodation for the exercise of
their conscientious beliefs, this Article will help to guide the conversa-
tion about these issues, encouraging lawmakers to take a more princi-
pled approach to conscience accommodations.
At its core, this project is primarily a descriptive one. It offers a
comprehensive account of the contemporary treatment of conscience in
American law, demonstrating that the principle of freedom of con-
science finds little consistent support in positive law. That is, if there is a
coherent and principled justification for treating some claims of con-
science differently than others, our legal system has thus far failed to
provide it. While recognizing that a universal approach to conscientious
accommodation may be impossible, and respect for conscience need not
be unqualified or unconstrained, the premise of this Article is that the
nature of these qualifications and constraints gives us valuable infor-
mation about society's attitudes towards conscience. This descriptive
element is necessary because it is impossible to offer recommendations
for negotiating future claims of conscience without first recognizing
where we currently stand.
The secondary aim of this Article, then, is to begin a discussion
about our normative aspirations for law's treatment of conscience. The
Article offers a tentative conclusion in this regard-namely, that the true
purpose of providing legal protection for claims of conscience is to re-
spect personal beliefs regardless of their content, and protect them from
oppressive majoritarian values. Accordingly, as a pluralistic society, we
ought to adopt a principled and content-neutral approach for accom-
modating claims of conscience. That is, future requests for conscien-
tious protection-such as those by public and private service providers
who oppose gay marriage, or those by physicians and scientists with
moral objections to new technology such as stem cell research and syn-
thetic biology-ought to be evaluated on a content-neutral basis. Alter-
natively, we must abandon the promise of freedom of conscience as a
hollow one, and recognize that our respect for conscientious belief is
based on nothing more principled than political judgments about the
merits of claimants' conscientious beliefs and actions.
and Religious Convictions as Categories for Special Treatment: The Exemption Strategy, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1605 (2007); Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of
Conscience?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 911 (2005).
7 I am indebted to scholars such as Kent Greenawalt, Brian Leiter, Martha Nussbaum,
Michael Perry, Steven Smith, Rob Vischer, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and others whose work has
inspired me to approach the question of conscience from a similarly broad perspective.
1392 [Vol. 33:4
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The Article proceeds in four steps. Part I provides a preliminary
definition of conscience. It briefly describes the ways in which law might
provide accommodations for claims of conscience, and outlines three
common arguments for doing so: the pragmatic argument, which views
respect for conscience as a necessary feature of a functioning society; the
intrinsic argument, which views respect for conscience as a means of
furthering personal autonomy and self-determination; and, finally, the
objective argument, which views conscience as a reflection of moral
truth.
Part II of the Article contends that legal scholarship as a whole has
taken too narrow a view of freedom of conscience, generally limiting
itself to discussion of religious, military, and medical contexts. This Ar-
ticle argues that a complete positive theory of the law of conscience
must extend beyond these contexts to include many cases of civil diso-
bedience, violent protest, tax avoidance, overt discrimination, and med-
ical neglect, where claimants frequently take action or seek legal ac-
commodation on the basis of their conscientious beliefs. More
importantly, it demonstrates that in these non-traditional cases, courts
and legislatures generally decline to apply the principle of respect for
conscience that purportedly motivates established legal protections in
the military and medical realms. In other words, while we use the lan-
guage of conscience to define a theory of legal accommodation, that
theory is inconsistently applied.
Part III critiques potential justifications that might be offered for
treating some claims of conscience more favorably than others-
contrasting, for example, conscientious opposition to war by military
personnel, which is legally protected, with opposition by taxpayers,
which is not. It demonstrates that none of the most common arguments
for differential treatment-distinguishing between action and inaction,
considering the degree of harm, evaluating causal proximity, distin-
guishing between an actor's personal and relational motivations, favor-
ing religious over secular claims, or relying on an explicit balancing
test-provide a satisfactory account of how positive law actually treats
claims of conscience.
In light of the above conclusion, Part IV defends the argument that
true respect for conscience demands a more consistent mechanism for
legal accommodation, at least as a prima facie matter. It emphasizes the
importance of establishing a coherent and repeatable test for conscien-
tious accommodation, even if that test (like the balancing approach of-
ten used in constitutional law) is open-ended and results in uncertainty
at the margins.
The Article concludes by offering two possible interpretations of
the law of conscience. First, perhaps the apparently incoherent treat-
ment of conscientious accommodation is in fact consistent with a bal-
2012] 1393
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ancing of interests, despite the fact that few lawmakers support their
decisions by explicit reference to a balancing test. Alternatively, perhaps
our ad hoc treatment of conscience is dependent on how closely the
content of the claim aligns with generally accepted and politically palat-
able moral principles. While either may offer a satisfactory descriptive
account of law's treatment of conscience, the Article concludes that
there is a clear normative preference. The kind of robust respect for
conscience to which every liberal society aspires, the Article argues, de-
mands the application of content-neutral principles that recognize the
inherent value of conscience when resolving negotiations for conscien-
tious accommodation. One promising mechanism for resolving such
disputes, the Article suggests, may be the kind of balancing analysis of-
ten used in constitutional law. This approach, of course, may be subject
to criticism, including concern that it risks being used as a proxy for
judgments based on majoritarian values. However, the alternative to
establishing a content-neutral guiding principle is to abandon the prom-
ise of freedom of conscience and concede that American society consid-
ers exercises of personal conscience to be valuable only to the extent
they align with widely accepted moral principles. This alternative, the
Article argues, would undermine the foundational purpose of legal ac-
commodation of conscientious belief, which is to protect individuals
from oppressive majoritarian understandings of morality.
I. WHAT IS CONSCIENCE AND WHY Do WE VALUE IT?
The first step in understanding law's approach to claims of con-
science is a better appreciation of the nature of conscience itself. To that
end, Part I sets forth a brief definition of conscience and explains three
arguments that are commonly used to justify legal accommodation for
claims of conscience.
A. What Is Conscience?
It may be impossible to establish a singular and comprehensive
definition of conscience.8 That said, the idea of conscience is not a diffi-
8 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the No-
Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REv. 655, 656 (2009)
("We are not entirely sure what the liberty of conscience is, means, or requires, but, neverthe-
less, it is... 'central... to the modern self-understanding generally."'); Steven D. Smith, The
Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 325, 326 (2005) ("When we rever-
ently invoke 'conscience,' 'freedom of conscience,' or the 'sanctity of conscience,' ... do we
1394 [Vol. 33:4
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cult one to grasp-even the youngest child has some understanding of
right and wrong, and of the nagging feeling of shame when she has
made the wrong decision.9 Very simply stated, a person's conscience is
that person's judgment of the moral quality of his or her own conduct.o
Immanuel Kant describes conscience as an "internal tribunal" in
which the judge and the accused are one and the same person."
"[C]onscience," he writes, "is the inward judge of all free actions."12
When a person is choosing between two courses of action, conscience is
the insistent voice inside her that tells her, "[t]his is right, and that is
wrong."13 If she chooses a course of action that does not conform with
her moral ideals, conscience is the source of the resulting feelings of
regret, shame, and guilt.14
When we describe a person as having acted on the grounds of con-
science, we typically mean that she "acted on the basis of a sincere con-
viction about what is morally required or forbidden."15 Thus, claims of
conscience can be understood as a subset of moral claims generally16-
one that connotes a strong link with individual identity and a preference
for suffering significant burdens rather than acting against conscien-
tious belief.17 In an effort to better identify the various types of legally-
relevant conduct that might be grounded in conscientious belief, Part
L.A highlights three characteristics of conscience that are particularly
important.
have any idea what we are talking about? Or are we just exploiting a venerable theme for rhe-
torical purposes without any clear sense of what 'conscience' is or why it matters?").
9 See Grazyna Kochanska et al., Guilt in Young Children: Development, Determinants, and
Relations with a Broader System of Standards, 73 CHILD DEV. 461 (2002).
10 See generally 42 IMMANUEL KANT, The Critique of Pure Reason; The Critique of Practical
Reason and Other Ethical Treatises; The Critique of Judgment, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WEST-
ERN WORLD (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) ("Every man has a
conscience, and finds himself observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him in
awe (reverence combined with fear); and this power which watches over the laws within him is
not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is incorporated in his being.");
Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Four Conceptions of Conscience, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 13, 14 (Ian
Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998) (describing conscience as the "capacity... to sense or
immediately discern that what he or she has done, is doing, or is about to do (or not do) is
wrong, bad, and worthy of disapproval").
11 See KANT, supra note 10, at 379 (emphasis omitted).
12 Id.
13 See Smith, supra note 6, at 922 (describing conscience as "a divine 'voice' speaking within
the soul of the individual").
14 See KANT, supra note 10, at 379; Hill, supra note 10 (noting that, when conscience is
disregarded, it results in "mental discomfort and lowered self-esteem").
15 Smith, supra note 8, at 328; see also KANT, supra note 10, at 379; HENRY DAVID
THOREAU, ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 9 (Wilder Publ'ns 2008) (1849) ("The only
obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right.").
16 See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be
Accommodated?, 9 AvE MARIA L. REV. 47, 49 (2010).
17 See id. at 49-50; Adam J. Kolber, Alternative Burdens on Freedom of Conscience, 47 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 919 (2010).
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1. Transcending Reason, Binding Action
One of the most mystifying characteristics of conscience is that it is
not necessarily backed by reason or logic.18 One cannot reason one's
way to conscience, because conscience "confesses the inadequacy of
intellect and transcends reason itself."9 In many respects, conscience is
almost involuntary; typically, it resists efforts to modify it or deny it. As
one author has described it, conscience binds a person in the grip of
"volitional necessity"-when conscience speaks, one has no choice but
to obey its commands.20 This serves as a basis for one of the justifica-
tions that is often offered in support of granting legal accommodation to
claims of conscience, namely that punishing people who act on grounds
of conscience is unlikely to have a deterrent effect, because the pull of
conscience is stronger than the pull of law.21
2. Shifting Boundaries: Beyond Religion
A second relevant characteristic of conscience is that its boundaries
are unclear and continually expanding. While originating in the context
of religious belief and faith-based obligation, the principle of freedom of
conscience developed to incorporate both religious and secular morali-
ty. Today, it is expanding to approach even some deeply held personal,
political, social, and philosophical beliefs.
An early version of the First Amendment proposed in the U.S.
House of Representatives in 1789 prohibited Congress from making
laws "establishing religion, . . . prevent[ing] the free exercise thereof,
18 In the similar context of religious belief, Brian Leiter identifies as one of religion's key
characteristics its "insulat[ion] from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification."
Brian Leiter, Foundations ofReligious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935,
945 (2010).
19 United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 53 F. Supp. 906, 907 (W.D.N.Y. 1943); see also Hill,
supra note 10, at 16 ("Conscience... is not the same as reason, judgment, or will." (emphasis
omitted)). But see KANT, supra note 10, at 379 (referring to conscience as an "intellectual
and... moral capacity," and suggesting that some nature of reasoning or judgment is in-
volved).
20 Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15
LEGAL THEORY 215, 215 (2009); see also Ehlert v. United States, 422 F.2d 332, 333 (9th Cir.
1970) (holding that, for purposes of military classification, changes in conscientious belief can
constitute "a circumstance over which the registrant has no control"); KANT, supra note 10, at
379 ("[Conscience] follows [man] like his shadow, when he thinks to escape."). Martin Luther
expressed a similar, oft-quoted, sentiment: "I cannot and will not recant anything, for to go
against conscience is neither right nor safe. Here I stand, I can do no other, so help me God.
Amen." THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 465 (Robert Andrews ed., 1993).
21 See infra Part I.B.
1396 [Vol. 33:4
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or... infring[ing] the rights of conscience."22 Indeed, many scholars
believe that "the framers viewed 'free exercise of religion' and 'freedom
of conscience' as virtually interchangeable concepts."23 Prior to the mid-
twentieth century, the most commonly accepted understanding of con-
science was religious in nature, 24 and the First Amendment, which ex-
pressly grants a right to freedom of religion, was a natural source of
relief for plaintiffs with strong conscientious convictions seeking protec-
tion from government oppression. 25 The concepts of religion and con-
science were so closely tied that, in judicial opinions, the two terms were
commonly paired with no explanation of the difference, if any, between
them.26
Since that time, the contemporary understanding of conscience has
broadened to expand beyond the scope of religious convictions. Steven
Smith has described the linking of freedom of conscience with religious
exercise as "problematic, if not thoroughly objectionable."27 Most legal
scholars now agree that protections for freedom of conscience must
necessarily apply to protections for "secularized conscience" as well.28
22 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97 (1985).
23 Smith, supra note 6, at 912. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Histor-
ical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1482-94 (1990).
24 Garnett, supra note 8, at 656; Smith, supra note 6, at 912 ("[F]or the preceding two-plus
centuries, pleas for 'freedom of conscience' had been a central theme in the campaign to pro-
mote greater freedom in matters of religion, and those pleas had routinely been made and
understood in essentially religious terms.").
25 See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) (holding that a Board
of Education requirement that children and teachers salute the American flag offends the guar-
antees of religious freedom established by the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
26 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944) (referring to a parent's "obvi-
ously earnest claim for freedom of conscience and religious practice"; a parent's claim to con-
trol his child's course of conduct as being grounded in "religion or conscience"; and parental
authority as including "matters of conscience and religious conviction"); Gobitis, 310 U.S. at
593 (describing the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom as one that is "brought
into question... only when the conscience of individuals collides with the felt necessities of
society").
27 Smith, supra note 6, at 912.
28 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 27-28 (1987) (describ-
ing moral claims to disobey the law as incorporating religious, aesthetic, and personal reasons);
Ronald Beiner, Three Versions of the Politics of Conscience: Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, 47 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2010) (describing the issue as one of "conscientious intellectual
commitment," rather than religious commitment); Garnett, supra note 8, at 659; Greenawalt,
supra note 6, at 1625, 1642 (arguing that while free exercise demands certain religious exemp-
tions, "nonestablishment, equal protection, and free speech sometimes require extension to
similarly situated nonreligious claimaints"); Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience,
47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 902 (2010) (assuming for the sake of argument that "religious claims
of conscience [are] moral claims that rest on a religious base"); Leiter, supra note 18, at 959
(arguing that "there is no reason to limit claims of conscience to claims of religious con-
science"); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008); Michael J.
Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (2010) (discussing
the treatment of secular conscience in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human Rights); Smith, supra note 6, at 912.
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This approach is reflected most notably in jurisprudence extending the
right of conscientious objection in the military to those with deeply held
beliefs outside the sphere of organized religion.29 According to the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Seeger, belief is a "broad spectrum," an
"ethical concept . . . founded on human experience,"30 that may in fact
fall outside the scope of any individual's definition of religious convic-
tion. In Welsh v. United States, for example, the claimant objector was
"insistent" in denying that his views against war were religious, going so
far as to cross out "religious training" as a reason for opposing participa-
tion in war on his Selective Service statement. 31 The Court, however,
concluded that the state ought not to defer to a registrant's interpreta-
tion of his beliefs, and may consider these beliefs to be "religious" in
nature if it is clear that the claimant holds them "with the strength of
more traditional religious convictions."32 Seeger and Welsh, according to
Kent Greenawalt, "essentially eroded any distinction between religious
and nonreligious claims to conscientious objection."33
While freedom of conscience has been broadly interpreted to in-
corporate both religious and secular understandings, many scholars
believe that many strongly held beliefs do, nevertheless, fall outside its
scope.34 Historically, the realms of political, social, and even philosophi-
cal belief were viewed as not rising to the level of conscientious convic-
tion. By way of example, the 1948 amendment to the Selective Training
and Service Act expressly excluded "essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code" from its definition
Martha Nussbaum describes the principle of religious freedom and equality as arising "from a
special respect for the faculty in human beings with which they search for life's ultimate mean-
ing." NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 19. While acknowledging the controversy surrounding the
overlap between religion and conscience, Nussbaum seems to view religious conviction as a
subset of conscientious conviction more broadly. See id. at 19-20. That being said, some have
expressed concern that expansion of the doctrine of conscientious objection to political, social,
and personal ethical realms will reduce a formerly divine doctrine to "personal existential
decision-making" and "consumer preferences." Garnett, supra note 8, at 658-59 (citing Marie
A. Failinger, Wondering After Babel: Power, Freedom and Ideology in U.S. Supreme Court Inter-
pretations of the Religion Clauses, in LAW AND RELIGION 81, 93-94 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000)); see
also Robert John Araujo, Conscience, Totalitarianism, and the Positivist Mind, 77 Miss. L.J. 571
(2007) (arguing that the exercise of conscience ought to be "founded on objective truth" rather
than "individual fancy").
29 See generally infra Part II.C.
30 380 U.S. 163, 183 (1965).
31 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970).
32 Id. at 343; see also Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All, supra note 5, at 53 (discussing
Welsh). Admittedly, in cases such as Welsh, the Supreme Court was simply trying to craft a
workable solution to the administrative challenge of identifying "legitimate" conscientious
objectors, rather than attempting to define the scope of conscientious belief as a philosophical
matter. However, its holdings in these cases are relevant in that they provide guidance about
societal understandings of conscience at the time.
33 Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 909; see also Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 50-51.
34 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 53 (noting that it is difficult to draw a clear line
between political and religious/conscientious bases for objection).
1398 [Vol. 33:4
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of "religious training and belief."3 Of this exclusion, the Supreme Court
in Seeger noted, "[t]hese judgments have historically been reserved for
the Government, and in matters which can be said to fall within these
areas the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to over-
ride that of the state."36 Notably, however, only five years later in Welsh,
the Court held that this statutory exemption should not be read to ex-
clude "those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign
affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in
all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public
policy."37 If we can conclude anything from this turnaround, it is that
the definition of conscience is not fixed or determinate, and that even
the most careful attempts at line-drawing in this arena may be subject to
challenge.38
3. Personal and Relational Components
A final characteristic of conscience, and one that will come into
play in Part III.D, is that conscience may have two dimensions: personal
and relational. The personal dimension of conscience is the one de-
scribed above-namely, an individual's judgment about the moral quali-
ties of her own conduct. However, conscience may also have a relational
dimension, described by Rob Vischer as "the notion that the dictates of
conscience are defined, articulated, and lived out in relationship with
others."39 That is, while the core of conscience is inward looking, the
relational aspect of conscience is necessarily broader. For example,
when a person acts on the basis of her conscientious beliefs, she (wheth-
er knowingly or not) serves as a model for those who observe her behav-
ior, and who may then modify their own beliefs in response to her ac-
tions. Other examples of the relational aspect of conscience may be
35 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
36 Id. at 173; see also Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946) (holding
that the phrase "by reason of religious training and belief' was included in the Act "for the
specific purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to
a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to
an authority higher and beyond any worldly one"); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 707-
08 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that the phrase "religious training and belief' was not intended to
include "philosophical and political considerations," such as a sincere "conviction that war is a
futile means of righting wrongs or of protecting the state, that it is not worth the sacrifice, that
it is waged for base ends, or is otherwise indefensible").
37 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-44 (noting, however, that conscientious objectors whose beliefs
are based in part on public policy must nevertheless be determined by the Selective Service
System to be "religious" objectors whose deeply held beliefs are "moral, ethical, or religious" in
nature).
38 See generally Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, supra note 28.
39 VISCHER, supra note 6, at 3; see also MICHAEL WALZER, The Obligation to Disobey, in
OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 3, 22 (1970).
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more direct, as where a conscientious actor deliberately communicates
her beliefs to others in an effort to change their views, their conduct, or
the shape of social discourse as a whole.
B. JustilyingLegalAccommoda tion of Conscience
Judging by the definition above, conscience is truly a formidable
force-as an individualized expression of personal moral identity, it is a
fundamental and unshakeable driver of human behavior. But it is one
thing to say that conscience is an essential element in personal decision-
making, and quite another to argue that expressions of conscience ought
to receive protection under the law. Part I.B explains the three most
common justifications that have been offered in support of legal ac-
commodations for exercises of personal conscience.
This debate arises because individuals with strong conscientious
beliefs may find themselves torn between their beliefs and the require-
ments or expectations of the law. To take a relatively simple example,
consider a pharmacist who believes that sex before marriage is a sin, and
is unwilling to fill prescriptions for birth control if the patient is an un-
married woman. In the absence of legal protections for acts of con-
science by medical professionals, the pharmacist who refrains from par-
ticipating in what she believes to be an immoral act may be subject to
disciplinary action or license revocation by the state pharmacy board, a
civil suit for negligence by the patient whose prescription she denied, or
adverse employment action by her employer.40 If she wants to avoid
undesirable legal consequences such as these, the pharmacist may be
forced to comply with the standard of care expected of her profession
and fill the prescription, no matter how troubling this might be for her
conscience.41 When faced with such a conflict, what alternative does the
pharmacist have but to seek legal accommodation for her conscientious
belief? Indeed, this story of negotiated accommodation is exactly what
has played out in the legislative arena since the Supreme Court's 1973
decision in Roe v. Wade.42
40 See Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered Care and
Limitations on the Right to Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV.
141, 165-75 (2010); Wilson, supra note 4, at 50-51.
41 Research shows that people who act in ways that violate their most deeply-held conscien-
tious beliefs tend to lose self-esteem and suffer emotional distress. See GREENAWALT, supra
note 28, at 315-16; Hill, supra note 10, at 14. For a discussion of the challenges faced by gov-
ernment officials who object to performing same-sex marriages, see Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage
Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 318 (2010).
42 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also infra Part II.B.
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According to Steven Smith, the person who invokes freedom of
conscience
is in effect saying to the rest of us: "Although you might think you are
justified in commanding or forbidding some performance, you
should nonetheless refrain from commanding or forbidding this of
me because I am opposed on the basis of a sincere conviction about
what is morally required or proscribed."43
Conceived in this way, a claim of conscience operates as an excep-
tion to the prima facie duty to obey the law.44 Much like the necessity
defense and other justifications in criminal and civil law, conscience
claims serve as "good reasons" to allow actions that deviate from legal or
social norms and, if successful, justify accommodation of those who
hold them.
Many modern societies, including our own, have been receptive to
such arguments, 45 despite the fact that regular legal recognition of
43 Smith, supra note 8, at 328.
44 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 21 ("Accommodation means giving religious people a
'break' in some area, for reasons of conscience-a dispensation from laws of general applicabil-
ity .... ); RAWLS, supra note 2, at 363; Richard J. Arneson, Against Freedom of Conscience, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1015, 1018-20 (2010) (describing citizens' underlying moral duty to obey
the rule of law to support the argument against conscientious accommodation); Kent
Greenawalt, The Rule of Law and the Exemption Strategy, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 1513, 1518
(2008) (describing exemptions based on religious belief as "a privilege not to comply with
ordinary legal requirements based on a criterion that refers to religious belief or practice");
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 903 (describing legislative accommodations of claims of con-
science) ("[T]hese may simply relieve rights bearers of what would otherwise be legal require-
ments, but they may go further and protect certain actions from being treated by private em-
ployers or other private entities as the basis for adverse consequences."); Smith, supra note 6, at
915 (noting that the protection of conscience "has typically been understood to consist of some
sort of rebuttable presumption of non-interference with conscience, qualified by something like
a 'compelling state interest' limitation").
45 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 2 ("This is a country that respects people's committed
search for a way of life according to their consciences. This is also a country that has long
understood that liberty of conscience is worth nothing if it is not equal liberty."); id. at 22
(identifying the principle of respect for conscience, including the provision of "a protected
space within which citizens may act as their conscience dictates" as well recognized in the
American constitutional and philosophical tradition); RAWLS, supra note 2, at 177 ("[F]reedom
of thought and liberty of conscience . .. ought not to be sacrificed to political liberty. . . ."); id.
at 173 (noting that the political system would be an unjust one if it did not incorporate liberty
of conscience); WALZER, supra note 39, at 12-15 (describing the "historical basis of liberalism"
as a series of recognitions by a larger society of the claims of a smaller group); id. at 14 (noting
that the right of an individual citizen to disobey societal obligations because of his conscien-
tious belief is "very common in history and has often been fairly stable over long periods of
time"); Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 48 (describing "historical recognition of the importance of
conscience" as recognized by early American citizens); Lynn D. Wardle, Protection of Health-
Care Providers' Rights of Conscience in American Law: Present, Past, and Future, 9 AVE MARIA
L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) ("[In the political theory of the Founding Fathers and the political princi-
ples undergirding the Constitution, protection of rights of conscience was essential, for without
it virtue in the people could not develop."). George Anastaplo, however, emphasizes that "there
is today much more official deference to scruples grounded in 'conscience' than was anticipated
in this country two centuries ago." Letter from George Anastaplo to Nadia Sawicki (Aug. 31,
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claims of conscience may threaten social order.46 Legal and political
theorists have recognized as one of the tenets of a liberal society the fact
that "any individual citizen, oppressed by the ruler of the state, has a
right to disobey their commands, break their laws, even rebel and seek
to replace the rulers and change the laws."47 In a letter from George
Washington to the Quakers, he assured them that "the conscientious
scruples of all men should be treated with great delicacy and tender-
ness," and that he wished for American law to "always be as extensively
accommodated to them, as a due regard for the protection and essential
interests of the nation may justify and permit."48 By 1971, John Rawls
considered "the question of equal liberty of conscience" to be "settled."49
"It is one of the fixed points of our considered judgments of justice."o
Indeed, American courts have long cited this country's "happy tradi-
tion" of "avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience,"51
whether by way of legislative exemption, selective non-prosecution or
non-enforcement, or dismissal by sympathetic judges and juries.52
Some might challenge the description of claims of conscience as
"exceptions" from a general duty to obey the law. Robin Fretwell Wil-
son, for example, emphasizes that conscientious objectors are not seek-
ing exemptions from pre-existing legal duties, but rather are seeking to
2010) (on file with author). Similarly, Barry Sullivan notes that there has been a significant shift
in expectations since that time-today, individuals tend to "think that it [i]s the state's job to
design their public responsibilities in a way that accommodate[s] or complement[s] their per-
sonal religious views." Barry Sullivan, Naked Fitzies and Iron Cages: Individual Values, Profes-
sional Virtues, and the Struggle for Public Space, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1687, 1710 (2004).
46 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 2, at 187 (noting that the state's right to restrict liberty of
conscience is derivative of its obligation to maintain public order); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (noting that routinely allowing exemptions on the basis of religious belief
would frustrate the "government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct").
47 WALZER, supra note 39, at 3 (citing Locke).
48 NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 14; see also John Alan Cohan, Civil Disobedience and the
Necessity Defense, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 111, 116 (2007) (citing American colonists' persecution for
"refusing to obey certain laws by reason of conscience").
49 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 181, 197.
50 Id. at 206.
51 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); see also
Gillettev. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971) ("[C]ongressional reluctance to impose such a
choice stems from a recognition of the value of conscientious action to the democratic commu-
nity at large, and from respect for the general proposition that fundamental principles of con-
science and religious duty may sometimes override the demands of the secular state.").
52 See GREENAWALT, supra note 28, at 282; Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1608. Notably (and
consistent with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in freedom of religion cases), these mech-
anisms for accommodation of personal conscience are permissive rather than mandatory in
nature. There is no constitutional requirement that legislatures provide exceptions from gener-
ally applicable laws on the basis of conscientious or religious belief, though such exceptions are
constitutionally permissible. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997); Smith, 494
U.S. at 886. But see Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1636 (noting that if exemptions are granted on
the basis of religious belief, the Equal Protection clause may require that they be extended to
non-religious believers as well).
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participate in a conversation about what the law should be.53 Wilson's
point, I take it, is that to conceive of granting exceptions to legal duties,
one must believe that there exists some baseline set of duties with nor-
mative priority.
I concede that once conscientious accommodations are successfully
negotiated and endorsed by way of legislation, it may be wrong to de-
scribe them as "exceptions" from a general duty to obey the law. That is,
the statutory permission granted to a pharmacist who refuses to distrib-
ute certain drugs is not an exception to the law-rather, it is the law.
However, while recognizing the risk in suggesting that yesterday's laws
(no matter how faulty or misguided) somehow take normative priority
over the laws of today, I believe that the language of "exceptions" in the
context of conscientious accommodation is supported by its use in other
areas.
For example, consider the common law duty of physicians to ob-
tain informed consent, often bolstered by state informed consent stat-
utes. This duty includes a number of established exceptions-a physi-
cian need not obtain consent in emergency situations, when the patient
is incapable of consenting, when the patient waives her right of in-
formed consent, or, in some rare cases, on grounds of therapeutic privi-
lege. These exceptions have been recognized in both common law, and,
occasionally, in informed consent legislation. But the fact that they are
legally recognized does not preclude us from referring to them as "ex-
ceptions." In this context and others, we begin with general rules about
prima facie duties, and then work in modifications to protect those who
we believe are acting justifiably. The language of "exceptions" is similar-
ly used in a host of other statutory contexts, including the duty to screen
and stabilize patients under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Ac-
tive Labor Act (EMTALA), which does not apply, inter alia, if the pa-
tient requests a transfer;54 and the duty under some state's laws to obtain
informed consent twenty-four hours in advance of an abortion, which
does not apply in emergency situations; and others.55 From my perspec-
tive, the language we use when referring to conscientious accommoda-
tions is less important than the varied justifications we offer for granting
them in the first place.
53 Conversation with Robin Fretwell Wilson (Sept. 22, 2010) (notes on file with author).
54 EMTALA also does not apply if a physician certifies that the benefits of transfer exceed
the risks, or if it is an "appropriate transfer" as defined in the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)
(2006).
55 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 1521-22 ("The written law itself contains
many, many exemptions and privileges.").
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1. Pragmatic Value: Ordering Society
The power of conscience is such that it often drives human behav-
ior even in the face of strong countervailing considerations. A person
acting on the grounds of conscience is often bound by "volitional neces-
sity," the feeling that she has no choice but to follow her conscience even
if that course of action is objectively impractical, illogical, or illegal.56
Indeed, one way of measuring the strength of a person's conscientious
belief is to ask whether she would be "willing to undergo significant
hardship" rather than engage in an act that she believes is unconsciona-
ble.57 In his Letter from Birmingham Jail, for example, Martin Luther
King, Jr. cited the early Christians as models of conscientious resistance,
on the grounds that they "were willing to face hungry lions and the ex-
cruciating pain of chopping blocks, before submitting to certain unjust
laws of the Roman Empire."ss If we accept that an individual may be
driven to act in accordance with her strong conscientious beliefs regard-
less of the consequences, we begin to understand the pragmatic argu-
ment for legal accommodation of conscience.
Punishment in a civil society can serve many purposes, among
them retribution, deterrence, and reform. However, punishing a person
for acting in accordance with her conscience rarely serves these purpos-
es effectively. First, because it is impossible to coerce belief against
someone's wishes, punishment of conduct motivated by conscientious
belief is unlikely to result in reform or rehabilitation.59 On a similar
note, the threat of punishment is unlikely to deter those acting on the
basis of conscientious conviction.60 That being said, some conscientious
56 See generally Koppelman, supra note 20.
57 Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1625; see also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 631-
32 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (describing how, rather than promise to obey a law that
conflicts with their religious beliefs, some citizens "have been willing to suffer imprisonment or
even death rather than to make such a promise"); Kolber, supra note 17 (arguing for imposing
"alternative burdens" on those who make claims of conscience as an effective means of estab-
lishing sincerity of conscientious belief).
58 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: AN ENCY-
CLOPEDIC HISTORY OF DISSIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 627 (Mary Ellen Snodgrass ed.,
2009).
59 GREENAWALT, supra note 28, at 315-16 ("Further, if the acts they are forced to perform
do, like military service and jury duty, require active cooperation over a period of time, they are
not likely to be the best candidates for the jobs involved."); id. at 275 ("[The actor who behaves
out of conviction] typically will not be a suitable candidate for reform."); Leiter, supra note 18,
at 941 (reading Locke as arguing that "the coercive mechanisms of the state are ill-suited to
effect a real change in belief about religious or other matters").
60 GREENAWALT, supra note 28, at 315-16; Beiner, supra note 28, at 1109 (describing
Hobbes's, Spinoza's, and Locke's interpretations of conscience as belief that "cannot be touched
by coercion"). But see Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 1529 (suggesting that parents ambivalent
about, rather than committed to, faith healing may be deterred by the prospect of criminal
1404 [Vol. 33:4
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objectors (those who are more are susceptible to the threat of punish-
ment, perhaps because their moral commitments are not as firm) may
be swayed by the threat of legal penalty, and may choose to comply with
the law despite their conscience's voice to the contrary. What is the like-
ly result for these persons, we might ask? "Deterrence of those who lack
the will to act on their convictions exacts a terrible price. Their feeling
that they have yielded to compulsion and violated their most deeply
held beliefs and principles may involve profound resentment and loss of
self-respect."61 Finally, when it comes to retribution, many believe that
the retributive purposes of punishment are poorly served by punishing
individuals who act on the basis of moral compulsion rather than self-
interest or impulsiveness.62
The pragmatic argument for legal accommodation of conscience
recognizes these concerns, and maintains that a civil society is unlikely
to function effectively if it chooses to punish conscientious objectors.63
That is, although granting conscience-based exemptions from legal ob-
ligations as a matter of course may wreak havoc on the state's ability to
maintain order,64 the same can be said of a state that rejects claims of
conscience altogether. The state has only a limited amount of control
over its citizens: While it can try to establish rules for an orderly society,
these rules will be nearly impossible to implement if they contradict the
conscientious beliefs of its citizens. And since it is impossible for a socie-
ty to adopt a body of laws that aligns itself perfectly with the beliefs of all
its citizens, the society must order itself in such a way as to mediate be-
tween the interests of social order and the interests of citizens who
penalties); Leiter, supra note 18, at 941 (offering historical evidence that states can, in fact,
"successfully inculcate beliefs" through coercion).
61 See GREENAWALT, supra note 28, at 315-16. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 54
(citing Roger Williams's analogization of violations of conscience, rape, and imprisonment).
62 See GREENAWALT, supra note 28, at 275, 315 ("The strength of conviction and willingness
to sacrifice that are required to act against self-interest in doing what one believes to be morally
correct are rightly considered admirable traits, not usually to be visited with harsh penalties.").
63 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 18, at 940-42 (describing Hobbes's and Locke's writings as
supporting the principle of instrumental toleration of religious liberty); Smith, supra note 6, at
911 (describing the "futility" rationale for respecting conscience).
64 See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1943) (noting that if all those
who distrusted American foreign policy classified as conscientious objectors "the military effort
might well have been seriously hampered"); supra note 46 and accompanying text. Some schol-
ars, however, have criticized this rationale. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 4, at 62 (arguing that
shifting the burden of access to controversial drugs from individual pharmacists to institutions
would not result in significant hardship); WALZER, supra note 39, at 11-12 ("[T]here is consid-
erable evidence to suggest that the state can live with, even if it chooses not to accommodate,
groups with partial claims against itself. The disobedience of the members of such groups will
be intermittent and limited; it is unlikely to be conspiratorial in any sense; it does not involve
any overt resistance to whatever acts of law enforcement the public authorities feel to be neces-
sary (unless these are radically disproportionate to the 'offense'). Such disobedience does not, in
fact, challenge the existence of the larger society, only its authority in this or that case or type of
case or over persons of this or that sort.").
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might feel disenfranchised by laws that violate their conscientious be-
liefs.65
2. Intrinsic Value: Autonomy and Human Flourishing
A second argument for legal accommodation views the exercise of
conscience as essential for human flourishing. There is intrinsic moral
value in autonomy and self-determination, proponents argue, and the
best way for the state to promote this value is to accommodate those
with sincere conscientious beliefs.66
Importantly, the argument for intrinsic value is content-neutral-it
supports the protection of conscientious belief regardless of whether
that belief is in fact reflective of some greater moral truth, and some-
times regardless of its consequences. Fostering the development of per-
sonal conscience and self-determination is not viewed as a tool for
achieving good outcomes, 67 but rather as a good in and of itself, reflect-
ing the idea that "what makes people human is the power to reason and
to choose."68 In the words of Steven Smith, it may sometimes be "more
important that people do what they sincerely think is right than that
they do what actually is right."69
Whether arising from a Kantian view of the unconditional worth of
all persons and the resulting respect for their own moral destiny,70 or
from John Stuart Mill's perspective that "society should permit individ-
65 Part II will describe the ways in which the American government mediates these inter-
ests-namely, by granting conscientious objectors immunity from liability only in certain
spheres of activity.
66 Brian Leiter's description of "recognition respect" and the "moral" or "principled" view
of toleration seems similar to the autonomy-based justification for accommodating conscience.
He describes a genuine principle of toleration as grounded in a dominant group's acknowl-
edgement that "there are moral or epistemic reasons," not just instrumental reasons, to permit
the conscientious actors' behavior, even if the majority group disapproves of the minority belief
or action. See Leiter, supra note 18, at 942-43. That being said, Leiter has also recognized that
"[a]ccommodation arguments may find their grounding in very different considerations than
those adduced here pertaining to religious toleration." Leiter, supra note 28, at 27 n.60 (empha-
sis added).
67 In fact, research in the context of medical decisionmaking lends little support to the
proposition that autonomy and information actually result in objectively better outcomes. See
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1993).
68 Marsha Garrison & Carl E. Schneider, Why Do We Value Autonomy? Autonomy as a
Moral Duty, in THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 80,
81 (2003); see also Leiter, supra note 28, at 7 ("[Bleing able to choose what to believe and how
to live .. . makes for a better life.").
69 Smith, supra note 6, at 929 (emphasis added).
70 See generally KANT, supra note 10, at 379; Hill, supra note 10, at 17 ("Kant's moral theory
holds that each of us must, in the end, treat our own (final) moral judgments as authoritative,
even though they are fallible.").
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uals to develop according to their convictions,"71 courts and commenta-
tors take it as a given that autonomous choice is valuable and should be
promoted. From granting constitutional protections for personal liber-
ties to imposing a requirement of informed consent in medical contexts,
American society has long recognized the value of autonomy and liberty
in personal decision-making.72 Given that we accept autonomy and self-
actualization as valuable, and given that conscience is described as fun-
damental, nonrational, and tied to one's own sense of self, 7 it is not a
leap to suggest that allowing a person to develop and realize her consci-
entious beliefs without legal imposition will advance her sense of self,
and in doing so maximize her well-being.74 Something similar has been
suggested by Steven Smith, who argues that when the state "coerces
people to act contrary to their core beliefs, it inflicts a particularly grave
and in a sense self-defeating kind of injury ... because insofar as per-
sonhood is undermined, the good of personal or human believing is
subverted. "
Notably, some have suggested that the intrinsic argument for ac-
commodation of conscience offers benefits to the state, not just the in-
dividual. For example, state deference to citizens' conscientious beliefs
may be "necessary for the rule of law in a republican form of govern-
ment" because it reinforces the moral basis for compliance with legal
rules generally.76 Alternatively, toleration of such "experiments of liv-
71 See TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHIcS 64 (6th
ed. 2008).
72 As Justice O'Connor wrote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the lib-
erty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice
Scalia, in his dissent, referred to this passage from Casey as the "famed sweet-mystery-of-life
passage." 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990). Some critics argue that such respect for autonomy is often excessive. See, e.g., CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1998) (setting forth a detailed critique of the theory
of autonomy as applied in medical practice); Willard Gaylin, Worshiping Autonomy, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec.1996, at 43.
73 See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72
BROOK. L. REv. 61 (2006) (arguing for an identity-liberty-based understanding of certain
claims of conscience).
74 Leiter, supra note 28, at 7-8 (identifying this as a plausible utilitarian argument in sup-
port of legal accommodation of conscience).
75 Smith, supra note 6, at 935-36; see also Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 47-48 (discussing
"existentially significant" acts); Perry, supra note 28, at 9-10.
76 See Wardle, supra note 45, at 8 (citing James Madison) ("[I]f men are not loyal to their
duty to their God and their conscience, it is folly to expect them to be loyal to mere legal
rules .... If you demand that a man betray his conscience, you have eliminated the only moral
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ing" may have epistemic value-much like the proverbial marketplace of
ideas of the First Amendment context, it may lead to the development of
moral knowledge even if individuals' conscientious beliefs do not in fact
reflect higher moral truths.77
3. Objectivism: A Greater Truth
A final argument for legal recognition of conscience considers acts
grounded in conscience worthy of respect because such acts are more
likely to reflect objective moral truths.78 Traditional religious under-
standings of conscience, for example, suggest that personal conscience is
an earthly reflection of a higher moral power. 79 That is, the value of ex-
ercising one's conscience lies not in the fact that it is an intrinsically
valuable exercise of autonomy and self-realization but because exercis-
ing one's conscience directs one to a higher moral truth.
The objectivist approach to conscience rests on three key assump-
tion-first, that some objective moral truth exists; second, that con-
science is an effective means for accessing this truth; and third, that law
is appropriately exercised in pursuit of moral ends. Each of these as-
sumptions, of course, is subject to serious challenges beyond the scope
of this Article.
For the purposes of this discussion, the most relevant distinction
between the objectivist justification and the intrinsic and pragmatic
justifications for respecting conscience is that only the objectivist ap-
proach is tied to the substance of a person's conscientious beliefs.so As
explained above, both the pragmatic and intrinsic arguments are con-
tent-neutral-that is, they justify legal accommodation of conscience as
a general matter because doing so, by definition, furthers social order or
human flourishing. Under a content-neutral approach, an autonomous
person's conscientious belief that killing one person may be morally
basis for his fidelity to the rule of law, and have destroyed the moral foundation for democra-
cy.").
77 Leiter, supra note 28, at 8-9 (citing John Stuart Mill). Note that this account differs from
the content-neutral account described above, which finds value within moral beliefs generally,
rather than using these beliefs (which may or may not be accurate) as a means for determining
a higher moral truth.
78 See generally Araujo, supra note 28, at 578 (arguing that conscience, to be valuable, must
be aligned with objective truth rather than "individual fancy"); Perry, supra note 28, at 11-13,
16-18; Smith, supra note 8, at 357-58 (arguing that the case for conscience depends, in part, on
moral objectivism).
79 See generally Garnett, supra note 8, at 658 ("For [St. Thomas] More, 'conscience was
inseparably connected to truth' and its value .... ); Hill, supra note 10, at 17-21 (describing the
popular religious view of conscience as a reliable reflection of objective moral truth, derivable
through instinct).
s0 Brian Leiter's theory of "appraisal respect" seems to be based on a similar concept. See
Leiter, supra note 18, at 939-40.
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required if necessary to save many other lives is (consequences aside) no
more or less worthy of respect than another person's belief that killing
others is always wrong. The objectivist approach, on the other hand,
values conscience because it apparently taps into a universal moral
truth. In other words, if personal conscientious beliefs were always mor-
ally correct, the objectivist would likely be willing to defend legal ac-
commodation for conscience without exception.
As we will see in Part II, however, conscientious beliefs come in all
shapes and sizes.81 For example, one person's conscience might direct
her to disconnect a dying loved one's ventilator to relieve him from suf-
fering and allow him to die; another person's conscience might demand
that she request aggressive treatment to preserve her loved one's life at
all costs. How can both be acting in accordance with a greater moral
truth? Could an objectivist defend the acts of two actors with contradic-
tory conscientious beliefs? I posit that he could not. Under an objectivist
approach, I believe, one person must be right and the other must be
wrong. The problem, of course, is that we lack the tools necessary to
determine which is which. Were an objectivist to accommodate both
acts, he would not be furthering moral truth-rather, he would be main-
taining the status quo, with one person advancing moral ends and the
other retreating from them. Instead, a true objectivist should allow the
law to accommodate personal conscience only in cases where that con-
science aligns with moral truths, a determination that is either difficult
or impossible to make.82 Moreover, any such determination would be
difficult to reconcile with the tenets of a pluralistic liberal society that
values, or at least respects, diversity of belief.83
II. THE TREATMENT OF CONSCIENCE IN AMERICAN LAW
When considering areas of intersection between conscience and
the law, the contexts that most often come to mind are explicitly reli-
gious claims, conscience-based refusals by medical providers to provide
controversial services such as abortion or contraception, and conscien-
81 See Hill, supra note 10, at 277 (observing that people who rely on conscience "often
approve of radically different principles, including some that may seem outrageous");
Koppelman, supra note 20, at 221 (noting that conscience can "generate exorbitant demands,"
such as for racial purification, that society does not want to respect).
82 To the extent that society does make such judgments, it is by will of the majority. This is
why, in the few situations in which conscience is routinely accommodated, these accommoda-
tions can usually be traced back to legislative enactments. Note, however, that even these legis-
lative enactments may sometimes be overturned in the face of public opposition, as in Maine,
where a "people's veto" repealed a recently adopted same-sex marriage law. See Susan M. Cov-
er, Mainers Vote Down Gay-Marriage Law, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 4 2009, at Al.
83 This distinction between respecting and valuing may be similar to Brian Leiter's distinc-
tion between "respect" and "toleration." See Leiter, supra note 18, at 938.
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tious objection in the military. Part II seeks to offer a more comprehen-
sive description of the various situations in which people seek to justify
acts of conscience that might, in the absence of legal protections, be
subject to civil, criminal, or administrative penalties.
Part II demonstrates that conscience may play a role in many legal
contexts not traditionally identified as conscience-based-including,
among others, civil disobedience, tax evasion, discrimination, medical
neglect, and even terrorism. 84 While some readers may dispute whether
each of these examples rises to the level of expression of conscientious
belief, surely we can agree that at least some of them do, which in itself
makes the important point that our understanding of conscience and
the law must be broadened beyond the military, medical, and religious
contexts.
Only once we recognize the various situations where conscience
and the law intersect is the inconsistent nature of American law's treat-
ment of conscience made obvious. In some cases, such as opposition to
war by prospective members of the military, claims of conscience are
accommodated; in others, such as opposition to war by taxpayers, con-
scientious actors may be subject to legal penalties. Part II, which de-
scribes law's response to claims of conscience in various contexts, pro-
vides a descriptive foundation for the analysis in Parts III, IV, and V.
A. Explicitly Religious Claims
As recognized in Part I.A, conscience encompasses both religious
and secular beliefs. That is, some who seek legal accommodation on the
basis of conscientious belief-those whose beliefs are religious in na-
ture-may be able to raise a constitutional claim for religious freedom
under the First Amendment. However, while the Constitution provides
explicit protection for the subcategory of religious claims of conscience,
it does not do so for claims of conscience as a general matter (or, obvi-
84 This list of situations in which conscience and the law intersect is by no means exhaus-
tive. For example, it does not include situations where government actors or those with some
degree of legal authority, such as jurors or attorneys, seek to excuse themselves from their
duties for reasons of conscience-including jurors with conscientious objections to capital
punishment, jurors who exercise the power of nullification when they object to the law being
enforced, attorneys who fail to adequately defend their clients when doing so would violate
their conscientious beliefs, and justices of the peace who refuse to marry same-sex couples.
Because these people have a special legal role not shared by everyday citizens, a discussion of
their right to refuse on grounds of conscience is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article
also does not address situations where considerations of conscience keep laws from being
enacted-for example, children are not required to attend public schools against their parents'
conscientious beliefs.
1410 [Vol. 33:4
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1410 2011-2012
HOLLOW PROMISE
ously, for the subcategory of purely secular claims).85 Since explicitly
religious claims of conscience are likely to receive the greatest protection
under the law by virtue of their constitutional basis, it makes sense to
begin the discussion there.
Claims for religious exemption from laws of general applicability
are brought as constitutional claims to religious freedom under the First
Amendment. Historically, courts evaluating such claims applied a strict
scrutiny test, overturning state laws that burdened religious exercise
unless they were narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.86
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court dramatically changed course,
holding that plaintiffs have no constitutional right to purely religious
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability.87 In other words,
while religious beliefs do receive special protections under the First
Amendment, these protections do not include a constitutional right to
legal accommodation of the type described in Part I.B.
As a constitutional matter, then, religious claims of conscience and
secular claims of conscience stand on equal footing. A claimant seeking
an exemption from a generally applicable law for reasons of conscience
usually has no constitutional right to such an exemption, regardless of
whether her conscientious belief is religious or secular in nature. If the
claimant hopes to succeed, she must make her arguments in the sub-
constitutional realm-that is, she must appeal to legislative or common
law rights, rather than constitutional ones.88 Indeed, in Employment
Division v. Smith, after rejecting the plaintiffs claim to a religious ex-
emption from an Oregon law criminalizing the possession of peyote, the
85 Conscience, as an independent concept, is not explicitly protected under the Constitu-
tion. Although there is some significant overlap-most notably in the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses of the First Amendment-the fit between conscience and constitutional
protection is necessarily imperfect. Drafters of the Constitution had initially considered grant-
ing explicit constitutional protection to freedom of conscience. Early versions of the First
Amendment prohibited Congress from "mak[ing]... law establishing religion, or... pre-
vent[ing] the free exercise thereof, or. . . infring[ing] the rights of conscience." See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94-98 (1985). As adopted, however, the relevant provision of the First
Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..... U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
86 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
87 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (holding that while the First Amendment
does not bar application of neutral, generally applicable laws to the exercise of religiously moti-
vated behavior, exceptions have been made where claimants rely on the Free Exercise Clause
"in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press").
88 See generally John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663,
1668 (2009) (arguing that courts should sometimes rely on sub-constitutional laws to enforce
constitutional norms, because "a large number of what we define as constitutional rights are
not actually required by the Constitution, but rather judicially crafted rules designed to imple-
ment underlying constitutional norms").
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Supreme Court suggested that the appropriate route for redress was in
the legislature.89
Congress responded directly to this challenge. Just three years after
the ruling in Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), effectively reinstating a form of strict scrutiny review for
laws substantially burdening religious expression.90 While RFRA has
since been ruled unconstitutional as applied locally and on the state
level, it is still enforceable as applied to federal law.91 It has been used by
claimants in contexts as varied as health care, 92 education,93 taxation,94
employment,95 prisoners' rights,96 and environmental regulations.97 In
evaluating these claims, courts must ask whether the state has demon-
strated that enforcement of the federal law against the claimant is neces-
sary to further a compelling state interest and whether enforcement is
the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.98 Outcomes in
such cases are highly fact-dependent.99
89 494 U.S. at 890.
90 RFRA provides that the government "shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion" unless it demonstrates that doing so is necessary to further a compelling government
interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)
(2006). Any person whose religious exercise is burdened in violation of RFRA "may assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government." Id. § 2000bb-l(c).
91 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniio do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Many states, however, have since adopted state RFRAs
with provisions similar to those of the federal RFRA. See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Ques-
tions of Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 595,
598 (1999).
92 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
that the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act does not violate claimants' rights under RFRA or
under the First Amendment).
93 See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a district court's grant
of a preliminary injunction ordering a school district to accommodate students' religious prac-
tice of carrying ceremonial knives); Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah
1995) (holding that a school choir's choice of Christian religious music did not violate plain-
tiffs' rights under the First Amendment or RFRA).
94 See Jenkins v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 483 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
there is no right to avoid payment of taxes for religious reasons under RFRA).
95 See Potter v. District of Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that fire
department's policy of prohibiting facial hair satisfied the compelling interest test under
RFRA).
96 See Alameen v. Coughlin, 892 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that prison policy
prohibiting display of religious beads did not satisfy the least restrictive alternative requirement
of RFRA); Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp 353 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing inmate's RFRA claim
with respect to prison regulations requiring short hair and prohibiting the wearing of a head-
band).
97 See United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs RFRA claim
with respect to the hunting of bald eagles under the Endangered Species Act).
98 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006); see generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitution's
Pragmatic Balance of Power Between Church and State, 2 NEXUS 33, 40 (1997).
99 A full discussion of courts' approaches to claims for religious exemption from generally
applicable laws under RFRA, Title VII, and the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this
Article. This brief description is merely intended to demonstrate that explicitly religious claims
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B. Claims by Medical Providers
Claims of conscience made by medical providers are often raised,
and are certainly discussed more frequently than any others, whether in
the news media, legal journals, or medical literature. Typically, these
cases arise when a medical provider chooses not to participate in a pro-
cedure that offends her conscience, and claims the right to do so with-
out legal repercussions (such as professional discipline, adverse em-
ployment action, or malpractice liability).loo The procedures that pro-
providers most often find objectionable are typically those relating to
reproductive health, including abortion, contraception, and steriliza-
tion. However, the scope of objection is now expanding to include other
controversial practices, such as stem cell research and end-of-life care.101
Medical providers' claims of conscientious objection are typically pro-
tected by federal and state law.
The first medical conscience clauses (that is, laws protecting a med-
ical provider's right not to participate in objectionable procedures) arose
in the wake of Roe v. Wade, which extended the Constitution's privacy
protections to include a woman's right to an abortion performed by a
willing medical provider. 102 Immediately after the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Roe, Congress passed the Church Amendment, which prohib-
its recipients of federal funding (including most hospitals) from requir-
ing their personnel "to perform or assist in the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in
the performance of such procedure or abortion would be contrary to his
religious beliefs or moral convictions," and provides that recipients of
federal funding may not discriminate against personnel on the basis of
their performance of or refusal to perform such procedures.o3 More
form a subcategory of claims of conscience that may be recognized as valid grounds for exemp-
tion from generally applicable laws.
100 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 4; Adelle M. Banks, Conscience Clauses Not Just About Abor-
tion Anymore, USA TODAY ONLINE (Oct. 24, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/
2009-10-24-conscience-doctorsN.htm (describing an Evangelical Christian physician who
resigned after refusing to provide birth control to single women); John Miller, Planned
Parenthood: Pharmacy Broke Conscience Law, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Jan. 13, 2011 (de-
scribing an Idaho pharmacist's refusal to dispense a prescription without confirmation that it
was not needed for post-abortion care); Dean Olsen, Plan B Users: Rejecting Prescriptions
Should Not Be Allowed, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Missouri), Jan. 2, 2009, at Al (describing a
pharmacy owner challenging the governor's proposal to require all pharmacies to fill emergen-
cy contraception).
101 See generally R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience-Refusing to Deliver Medical
Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 2471 (2005).
102 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7. The Church Amendment also provides that a state may not require
hospitals to make their facilities available for sterilization or abortion if "the performance of
such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious
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generally, the Church Amendment states that no individual shall be
required to assist in "any part of a health service program or research
activity funded [by HHS]" if it "would be contrary to his religious beliefs
or moral convictions."104 Today, the Church Amendment is bolstered by
the 2004 Weldon Amendment, which restricts federal funding to enti-
ties that abide by conscience laws;105 2008 Health and Human Services
regulations;106 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act;107 the Coats-Snowe
Amendment to the Public Health Service Act;108 and other laws and
regulations. 109 Many states have also adopted legislation protecting phy-
sicians and pharmacists from employment discrimination, professional
beliefs or moral convictions," and may not require the entity to provide personnel for such
procedures if it "would be contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such person-
nel." Id.
104 Id.
105 See generally Wilson, supra note 4, at 49-50.
106 President Bush adopted these regulations immediately before he left office, to take effect
the day President Obama took office. Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices In Violation of
Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,274 (Aug. 26, 2008). The Obama Administration recently rescind-
ed part of that regulation to much public outcry. Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal
Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,968 (Feb. 23, 2011); see also
Rescission of the Regulation Entitled "Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of
Federal Law"; Proposal, 74 Fed. Reg. 10207 (Mar. 10, 2009) (proposing rescission of the Bush
regulation).
107 Title VII provides that an employer may not discriminate against employees based on
religion, unless the employer demonstrates that he is "unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's business." See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that Title VII does not require an employer to offer alternatives that
would constitute an "undue hardship" within the meaning of the statute); Bruff v. N. Miss.
Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that hospital was not required to
accommodate plaintiff employee by excusing her from counseling homosexual clients on sub-
jects which conflicted with her religious beliefs, as such accommodation would have constituted
an undue burden as a matter of law); Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220
(3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting Title VII claim where employee refused employer's offers of reasonable
accommodations). That being said, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "undue hardship"
requirement does little to protect employees-it has held that anything "more than a de
minimis cost" to the employer can constitute undue hardship. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
108 The Coats-Snowe Amendment to the Public Health Service Act provides that the state
may not discriminate against a health care entity that "refuses to undergo training in the per-
formance of induced abortions, to require or provide such training, to perform such abortions,
or to provide referrals for such training or such abortions, . . . refuses to make arrangements for
[such] activities,. .. or . .. attends (or attended) a post-graduate physician training program, or
any other program of training in the health professions, that does not (or did not) perform
induced abortions or require, provide or refer for training in the performance of induced abor-
tions, or make arrangements for the provision of such training." 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a).
109 The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, for example, prohibits health
insurance exchange plans from discriminating against providers based on their refusal to par-
ticipate in abortions. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1303,
124 Stat. 119, 168-71 (2010).
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discipline, or malpractice liability as a result of their refusal to partici-
pate in abortion or other reproductive health procedures. 1o
As the capabilities of modern medicine expand, medical providers
with strong moral beliefs have begun to raise objections beyond the
reproductive context. Some physicians who treat patients at the end of
life, for example, may refuse to comply with a family member's request
for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, citing reasons of con-
science.II Other physicians may refuse to comply with a family mem-
ber's request to provide arguably futile care to a similarly situated pa-
tient.112 Some state legislatures have responded to these concerns by
broadening their conscience clause protections.113 For example, Louisi-
ana's medical conscience law provides that "[a]ny person has the right
not to participate in... any health care service that violates his con-
science to the extent that patient access to health care is not compro-
mised.",14 It defines "health care service" to include not only abortion
and dispensation of abortifacient drugs, but also "human embryonic
stem cell research, human embryo cloning, euthanasia, [and] physician-
assisted suicide."' 5
Although the Church Amendment also extends its protections to
providers who do choose to offer abortion,1I6 many statutes adopted
since that time only protect providers who wish to be excluded. That is,
they generally do not protect those who use conscience to justify their
active involvement in controversial procedures,117 such as physician-
110 See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscien-
tious Refusal, 21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 163, nn.38-45 (2010); Wilson, supra note 4, at 50-52.
ill See generally Stephen Wear et al., Toleration of Moral Diversity and the Conscientious
Refusal by Physicians to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 147 (1994).
112 See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilat-
erally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (2007).
113 See generally Pope, Legal Briefing, supra note 110 (citing state laws to this effect).
114 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.9 (2011) (emphasis added).
115 Id.; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-611 (2011) (defining health care services to include
stem cell treatment, cloning, and end of life treatment); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-728c (2011)
(defining health care services to include certain procedures involving the destruction of in vitro
human embryos, procedures on fetuses in artificial wombs, procedures involving fetal tissue or
organs, as well as assisted suicide and euthanasia); L.B. 461, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011)
(providing for employer accommodation of religious objections to abortion, as well as experi-
ments or medical procedures involving human embryos, non-therapeutic medical procedures
on developing fetuses, transplants using fetal tissue that comes from a source other than still-
birth or miscarriage, and acts causing or assisting a person's death). The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of a health care entity's refusal to
provide "assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing." Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1553, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
116 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006).
117 See Mark R. Wicclair, Negative and Positive Claims of Conscience, 18 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 14 (2009); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Whose Conscience Counts? (Feb. 21,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1888375.
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assisted suicide, euthanasia, female genital mutilation, voluntary ampu-
tation, and legal executions.118
C. Claims by Military Objectors
A third commonly recognized intersection between conscience and
the law occurs in the military context. Since the early days of the Ameri-
can republic, pacifists and others with conscientious objections to com-
bat have sought, and often received, exemptions from service.119
The Draft Act of 1917 exempted conscientious objectors from
combat training and service only if they "belonged to 'any well-
recognized religious sect or organization... whose existing creed or
principles forb[ade] its members [from] participat[ion] in war."'120 This
sectarian restriction was abandoned in the 1940 Selective Training and
Service Act, which provided a combat exemption for any person who
conscientiously objects to participation in war "by reason of religious
training and belief,"121 later defined as "an individual's belief in a rela-
tion to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation."122 The Supreme Court, called upon to interpret
this provision in 1965, held in United States v. Seeger that the test of
belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a sincere and mean-
ingful belief "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption."23 In
adopting such a broad reading of the Act, the Court paved the way for
exempting individuals who deny that their objections are religious in
118 For example, some prison physicians who are asked to participate in legally authorized
executions refuse to do so for reasons of conscience; others believe they are morally obligated to
assist in the lethal injection process to ensure that prisoners feel no pain. Many states have
adopted laws that protect physicians from professional discipline on the basis of their participa-
tion in, or refusal to participate in, legally authorized executions. Nadia N. Sawicki, Doctors,
Discipline, and the Death Penalty: Professional Implications of Safe Harbor Policies, 27 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 107 (2008).
119 See generally Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the
Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1793, 1806-08
(2006) (discussing military exemptions dating back to 1673).
120 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 443 n.8 (1971).
121 Id.
122 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
123 Id. at 176. In Seeger, three conscientious objectors raised a constitutional challenge to
Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which exempted from combat
training and service only those whose conscientious opposition arises by reason of their "reli-
gious training and belief." Id. at 164-65. The petitioners argued that the Act's definition of
"religious training and belief' violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses because it
did not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors and it discriminated between different
forms of religious expression. Id. The Court did not resolve the constitutional issue, because it
interpreted the Act broadly, finding that the petitioners' beliefs fell within the Act's exceptions.
Id. at 185-88.
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nature and instead cite ethical or even policy grounds for their opposi-
tion to war.124
Issues of conscientious objection to military combat have become
less common since the United States discontinued the draft and shifted
to an all-volunteer policy in 1973. Today, conscientious objector claims
typically arise when voluntarily enlisted service members subsequently
seek discharge from active service pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act,125 citing a change in beliefs or values. 126 The
burden is on the service member to demonstrate the sincerity of his
objection by clear and convincing evidence.127 The Department of the
Army Conscientious Objector Review Board (DACORB) has sole dis-
cretion to resolve conscientious objector claims; its decision will be up-
held on judicial review unless it has no basis in fact.128 In recent years, a
number of servicemen and women have successfully obtained exemp-
tions from combat duty pursuant to this policy. 129
Notably, while voluntarily enlisted service members may petition
for separation from the armed forces or reassignment to non-combat
124 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
125 The current Department of Defense policy on conscientious objection is codified in
section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act. The term "conscientious objection" is defined
as a "firm, fixed and sincere objection to participation in war in any form or the bearing of
arms, because of religious training and belief." Conscientious Objection, Army Reg. 600-43, at
27 (Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r600_43.pdf. The term
"religious training and belief' is further defined to include "deeply held moral or ethical be-
lieffs]," even if the applicant himself characterizes them as non-religious. Id. at 27-28.
126 In Watson v. Geren, for example, the petitioner (while attending medical school) received
an Army scholarship in exchange for his commitment to serve one year on active duty for each
year of funding received, and to remain in the Army Reserve for five years thereafter. 569 F.3d
115, 118 (2d Cir. 2009). At that time, he was not opposed to participating in war or serving as
an officer. Id. In 2006, as his residency training was nearing completion, petitioner filed an
application for discharge as a conscientious objector, stating that his beliefs about participation
in war had changed. Id. at 119. Although the investigating officer recommended that petitioner
be classified as a conscientious objector and discharged, the Department of Army Conscien-
tious Objector Review Board (DACORB) denied Watson's application. Id. at 125-27. On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit found no valid basis in fact for DACORB's decision, and granted the
petitioner's application. Id. at 134-35.
127 Army Reg. 600-43, supra note 125, at 2.
128 United States ex rel. Foster v. Schlesinger, 520 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that,
in determining whether there is a basis in fact to support a decision, the court may not substi-
tute its own judgment for that of the military, and should not weigh the evidence to determine
whether the decision was justified). Nonetheless, as the First Circuit recently explained,
"[a]lthough this standard of review is a narrow one, it is not toothless. A basis in fact will not
find support in mere disbelief or surmise as to the applicant's motivation. Rather, the govern-
ment must show some hard, reliable, provable facts which would provide a basis for disbeliev-
ing the applicant's sincerity, or it must show something concrete in the record which substan-
tially blurs the picture painted by the applicant. The DACORB's reasons for its decision must
be grounded in logic and a mere suspicion is an inadequate basis in fact." Hanna v. Sec'y of the
Army, 513 F.3d 4, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
129 See Tamar Lewin, A Hotline Grapples with Evolving Appeals for Conscientious Objector
Status, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A13; see also, e.g., Geren, 569 F.3d at 130-35; Hanna, 513
F.3d 4.
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duty for reasons of conscience, military courts have held that conscien-
tious objector status may not be used as a defense to disobeying a direct
command.130 In United States v. Webster, for example, the appellant, an
Army combat engineer who had converted to Islam a few years after
entering the military, failed to obey an order for deployment to Iraq. He
had filed a conscientious objector petition the same day he was to have
been deployed, and at his court martial hearing tried to use his objector
status as a defense to the charge of disobeying a direct order. The court,
citing well-established precedent, rejected his claim, holding that there
is "no authority for a self-help remedy of disobedience."l31 "Unlike du-
ress, conscientious objection is generally not a defense to the offenses of
failure to obey lawful orders or missing movement."132 Thus, while mili-
tary policy allows service members to preemptively seek discharge or
reassignment by citing conscientious objector status, they may not use
their status post hoc to defend themselves against charges of miscon-
duct.
D. Other Claims
While the most prominent examples of individuals seeking con-
science-based exemptions from the law arise in the religious, medical,
and military contexts, these are by no means the only examples. In the
realms of property law, criminal law, tax law, discrimination law, and
family law, actors also make claims of conscience-usually with limited
degrees of success. Part II.D enumerates just a few of these situations.
130 United States v. Webster, 65 M.J. 936, 942-43 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2008); United States v.
Johnson, 45 M.J. 88, 90-91 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
131 Webster, 65 M.J. at 943; see also Johnson, 45 M.J. at 90-91.
132 Webster, 65 M.J. at 92. The Webster court cited United States v. Wilson, 41 C.M.R. 100
(C.M.A. 1969), in which the court upheld a service member's conviction for absenting himself
without leave, holding,
[The position of] a person in the military service who develops convictions of con-
science that conflict with his military duties[, whose] position is like that of a civilian
whose religion or conscience is in conflict with lawful orders of the Government.
Speaking of the latter, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that to allow
scruples of personal conscience to override the lawful command of constituted au-
thority would "in effect ... permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." ...
[T]he freedom to think and believe does not excuse intentional conduct that violates
a lawful command. . . . If the command was lawful, the dictates of the accused's con-
science, religion, or personal philosophy could not justify or excuse disobedience.
Wilson, 41 C.M.R. at 101 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Stewart, 43
C.M.R. 112, 115-16 (C.M.A. 1971) (holding that conscientious objection "is a defense to a
court-martial proceeding only if the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation so provides").
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1. Nonviolent Civil Disobedience
Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Greensboro Four are
paradigms of civil disobedience, engaging in conscience-driven protests
against discriminatory laws. However, these individuals were not seek-
ing legal accommodation for their actions in the same way as the mili-
tary, medical, and religious objectors described above-rather, they
were hoping to be prosecuted, with the goal of drawing public attention
to legal injustices.133 In this respect, they differ from traditional consci-
entious objectors, as granting a legal exemption for their actions would
perhaps be "inconsistent with the motivation for their conduct."34
That being said, a true understanding of law's treatment of con-
science necessitates study of those who engage in civil disobedience,
because personal considerations of conscience lie at the heart of their
public efforts to promote legal and social change.135 Certainly, these
activists want their actions to make a social statement-but the reason
this statement is necessary is because of the persistent internal voice of
conscience telling them that the status quo is unjust, and that their own
moral integrity would be at risk if they do not address this injustice.136
As history demonstrates, however, those who engage in civil disobedi-
ence to protest discriminatory laws suffer legal consequences, at least
until a majority of voters come to understand the justice of their causes.
Beyond the civil rights movement, modern activists who engage in
nonviolent civil disobedience often do so by trespassing on private
property to protest policies or activities with which they disagree137-
including military defense programs; 3 8 nuclear policy;139 foreign poli-
133 Thanks to Rob Vischer for his helpful critique of this Part.
134 E-mail from Rob Vischer to the author (Aug. 17, 2010) (on file with author).
135 See supra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the personal and relational elements of con-
science.
136 See THOREAU, supra note 15, at 17 ("It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to
devote himself to the eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still properly
have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he
gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support."). But see Daniel Markovits,
Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897 (2005) (distinguishing between civil/political
disobedience and conscientious objection).
137 See generally EDUARDO MOISPS PERALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS:
How SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Dorell, 758 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting necessity defense
where defendant trespassed on an air force base to protest the MX missile program).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting the necessity
defense for a defendant charged with trespass at naval base in order to prevent deployment of
nuclear submarines there, on the grounds that danger was not imminent); United States v.
Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the necessity defense for a defendant who
unlawfully entered a naval installation for the purpose of temporarily stopping the United
States Navy's use of the facility to conduct military training exercises with nuclear submarines);
United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the necessity defense
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cy;140 environmental policy;141 and abortion policy.142 When criminal
charges are brought against them, they raise the necessity defense, argu-
ing that their misconduct is necessary to prevent greater societal harm.
While not typically framed in the language of conscience, the necessity
defense as used in these cases essentially rests on the actor's conviction
that the policy or activity being protested is morally odious, and her
sincere conviction that morality demands active intervention on her
part. Ultimately, activists in such situations typically face punishment
for their actions, because courts almost uniformly reject the necessity
doctrine. 143 In cases of civil disobedience, defendants are rarely able to
satisfy the four prongs of the narrow necessity defense: that the defend-
ant was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; that she
acted to prevent imminent harm; that she reasonably anticipated a di-
rect causal relationship between her conduct and the conduct to be
averted; and that she had no legal alternatives to violating the law.144
A final example of conscience-based nonviolent civil disobedience
is the New Sanctuary Movement, which encourages sheltering or
providing aid to undocumented immigrants in violation of state and
federal law. According to the website for the New Sanctuary Movement,
its purpose is, as "an act of public witness," to "enable congregations to
because the defendant had other "opportunities for the propagation of the anti-nuclear mes-
sage"); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the necessity
defense where defendants blocked entry to a nuclear weapons facility); Commonwealth v.
Capitolo, 498 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985) (finding that the danger of a nuclear explosion was not suffi-
ciently immediate to warrant the necessity defense).
140 See, e.g., United States v Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving 30 people who
entered an IRS field office in Arizona chanting, "Keep American tax dollars out of El Salvador,"
and splashing fake blood in the office); State v. Drummy, 557 A.2d 574 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)
(holding the necessity defense was unavailable where defendants broke into Army recruiting
office to protest war in Nicaragua because there was no causal link between the break-in and
the prevention of atrocities allegedly being committed by the United States in Nicaragua).
141 See, e.g., United States v. DeChristopher, No. 2:09-CR-183, 2009 WL 3837208 (D. Utah
Nov. 16, 2009) (rejecting the necessity defense of an environmental activist who interfered with
government auction for oil drilling leases).
142 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 514 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (rejecting abortion protest-
ers' argument that they were attempting to stop a woman who "looked" to be more than 20
weeks pregnant from entering a clinic on the ground that the activists were making only an
educated guess); Buckley v. City of Falls Church, 371 S.E.2d 827 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting
the necessity defense of abortion protesters who trespassed at an abortion clinic to distribute
literature); see also Commonwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d 1325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (rejecting
abortion protesters' argument asserting justification for trespass). But see Allison v. City of
Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. Crim. App. .1991) (rejecting the necessity defense, noting
that abortion is constitutionally protected); People v. Berquist, 608 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (same); City of Wichita v. Tilson, 855 P.2d 911 (Kan. 1993) (noting, and listing, cases
where appellate courts have rejected the necessity defense in abortion clinic "rescue" prosecu-
tions); People v. Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. City Ct., Rochester 1988) (allowing the neces-
sity defense where protesters staged sit-in at hospital that performed late-term abortions).
143 See supra notes 138-142.
144 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 552 (5th ed. 2010); see also United States v. Agui-
lar 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989).
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1420 2011-2012
2012] HOLLOW PROMISE 1421
publicly provide hospitality and protection to a limited number of im-
migrant families whose legal cases clearly reveal the contradictions and
moral injustice of our current immigration system."45 Participants in
the movement, who risk legal punishment to defend immigrants' rights,
explicitly cite reasons of conscience and compassion for doing so.146
While there have been only a few reported cases of sanctuary providers
facing legal punishment,147 spokespersons for the U.S. Customs and
Immigration Department have been clear that those who violate immi-
gration laws will "face the consequences of their actions." 148
2. Violence and Terrorism
While the classic definition of civil disobedience is limited to non-
violent protest,149 some protesters ultimately turn to violence to make
145 Prophetic Hospitality: Strategy for a New Movement, NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
(Jan. 14, 2012, 10:45 PM), http://www.newsanctuarymovement.org/hospitality.htm.
146
The New Sanctuary Movement is a coalition of interfaith religious leaders and partic-
ipating congregations, called by our faith to respond actively and publicly to the suf-
fering of our immigrant brothers and sisters residing in the United States. We
acknowledge that the large-scale immigration of workers and their families to the
United States is a complex historical, global and economic phenomenon that has
many causes and does not lend itself to simplistic or purely reactive public policy so-
lutions. We stand together in our faith that everyone, regardless of national origin,
has basic common rights, including but not limited to: 1) livelihood; 2) family unity;
and 3) physical and emotional safety. We witness the violation of these rights under
current immigration policy, particularly in the separation of children from their par-
ents due to unjust deportations, and in the exploitation of immigrant workers. We
are deeply grieved by the violence done to families through immigration raids. We
cannot in good conscience ignore such suffering and injustice.
The New Sanctuary Movement: Building on a Powerful Tradition, NEW SANCTUARY MOVE-
MENT (Jan. 14, 2012, 10:45 PM), http://www.newsanctuarymovement.org/movement.html.
147 See Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
147 (2010); Emily Breslin, Note, The Road to Liability Is Paved with Humanitarian Intentions:
Criminal Liability for Housing Undocumented People Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(A)(1)(A)(III), 11
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 214 (2009).
148 Louis Sahagun, Giving Shelter from the Storm of Deportation, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at
B2. 8 U.S.C. § 1324, for example, imposes criminal penalties on anyone who "knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States
in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor,
or shield from detection, such alien in any place." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). Alt-
hough some localities have liberal sanctuary laws, see Julia Duin, California's Safe-House Sol-
diers, WASH. TIMES, May 30, 2008, at Al, local sanctuary providers are still subject to federal
prosecution. Consider also the widely publicized 2010 Arizona law that subjects cities to poten-
tial liability for not enforcing its provisions regarding police enforcement of immigration laws.
See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona's Effort to Bolster Local Immigration Authority Divides Law
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 2010, at A16.
149 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 364 (defining civil disobedience as "a public, nonviolent,
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a
change in the law or policies of the government").
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1421 2011-2012
1422 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:4
their voices heard. Some pro-life advocates, for example, rather than
simply picketing abortion clinics, have chosen to threaten, assault, or
even kill physicians who provide abortions.150 Scott Roeder, who in 2009
shot and killed Dr. George Tiller while he was at church, justified his
actions as necessary to save the lives of unborn children. 151 In Roeder's
case and others, defendants who engage in violence on the basis of mor-
al compulsion often claim the necessity defense. Courts, however, have
uniformly rejected this defense on the same grounds as in traditional
cases of civil disobedience.152
Outside the abortion context, nearly every example of nonviolent
civil disobedience (by means of trespass, for example) has a more vio-
lent analogue. Opponents of U.S. government policies have bombed or
attacked government buildings, killing or injuring hundreds.153 Joseph
Stack, the pilot who crashed his plane into a Texas IRS building in early
2010, cited opposition to tax law as a significant motivating factor in his
decision. 154 An apparent suicide note Stack posted online describes the
United States as a "totalitarian regime" that coerces compliance with tax
laws "not even the experts understand."155 Stack concluded the note by
writing, "[i]t has always been a myth that people have stopped dying for
150 The National Abortion Federation, a pro-choice organization that compiles statistics on
the frequency of violent acts against abortion providers, reports 7 murders, 14 attempted mur-
ders, and 13 bombings taking place between 1994 and 2009. NAF Violence and Disruption
Statistics, NAT'L ABORTION FED'N, http://www.prochoice.org/pubs-research/publications/
downloads/about abortion/violence_stats.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
151 Defendant Says He Killed Abortion Provider to Save the Unborn, WASH. POST, Jan. 29,
2010, at A4; Roxana Hegeman, Abortion Doctor's Killer Gets Life Prison Term, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 2010, at A8 (reporting that Roeder shouted, as he was being led out of the
courtroom: "Blood of babies on your hands."); Joe Stumpe & Monica Davey, Abortion Doctor
Slain by Gunman in Kansas Church, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at Al.
152 See Setback for Killer ofAbortion Provider, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2009, at A4; see also Hill
v. State, 688 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1996) (rejecting the necessity defense where defendant argued that
killing of doctor and doctor's companion was necessary to prevent abortions).
153 In 1970, four men bombed Sterling Hall at the University of Wisconsin, which housed a
research facility funded by the Army, injuring three and killing one. The bombers described
their act as "not an isolated attack by 'lunatics,"' but rather "a conscious action," necessary to
destroy "a vital cog in the machinery of U.S. imperialism, the most vicious and brutal machin-
ery in the history of mankind." Text of the FBIAffidavit Charging Four in University of Wiscon-
sin Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1970, at A25. In 1990, tax denier Peter Hendrickson mailed a
firebomb to the IRS, injuring a postal worker. Jason Zengerle, Hell Nay, We Won't Pay!, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Mar. 29, 2009, at 40. In 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a homemade bomb in
front of the Oklahoma City Federal building, killing approximately 167 people. John Kifner,
U.S. Indicts 2 in Bomb Blast in Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at Al. In 2010, Andrew
Joseph Stack III flew a plane into a Texas IRS building, killing one person and injuring two
others. Michael Brick, Man with Grudge Against Tax System Crashes Plane into Texas I.R.S.
Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A14.
154 See David Cay Johnston, Tax Law Was Cited in Software Engineer's Suicide Note, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at Al7.
155 See Remains of 2 Found After Austin Plane Crash, CNN.COM (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/02/18/texas.plane.crash (providing text of the apparent suicide
note).
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their freedom in this country .... I know there have been countless be-
fore me and there are sure to be as many after. But I also know that by
not adding my body to the count, I insure [sic] nothing will change."156
Timothy McVeigh, who was responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing, reportedly took his extreme action because of his fierce oppo-
sition to the government's firearms policies, including the passage of the
Brady Bill. 157 In the realm of environmental policy, some activist groups
(such as the Animal Liberation Front) have shifted from simple protests
to more serious actions, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in dam-
ages to private property and occasionally injuring individuals. As with
other forms of violent civil disobedience, no legislation exists to protect
the rights of "eco-terrorists," and their arguments for the necessity de-
fense are soundly rejected.158
At the furthest end of the spectrum, even textbook examples of ul-
tra-violent terrorism-including the tragic events of September 11,
2001, and suicide bombings in the Middle East-can often be under-
stood as manifestations of conscientious belief. The language used by
perpetrators and proponents of such attacks is often religious in nature,
and grounded in the conviction that the status quo is morally untenable
and that direct violence is necessary to right these wrongs and to main-
tain their own spiritual integrity.159 Although the acts perpetrated by
these individuals cause significantly more damage than those done by
non-violent protesters, 160 the difference in their motivations appears to
be one of degree, rather than kind.
3. Tax Denial and Evasion
Conscientious opposition to military action has also found expres-
sion in the realm of tax law, with objectors refusing to pay taxes that
contribute to what they consider to be morally objectionable defense
efforts. In Waitzkin v. Commissioner, for example, taxpayers claimed a
"war crimes deduction," arguing that payment of income taxes to be
used for war and defense related purposes "would violate their con-
156 Id.
157 See John Kifner, McVeigh's Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at Al.
158 See Steve Vanderheiden, Eco-Terrorism or Justified Resistance? Radical Environmentalism
and the "War on Terror," 33 POL. & soc'Y 425 (2005).
159 See generally Yuval Neria et al., The Al Qaeda 9/11 Instructions: A Study in the Construc-
tion of Religious Martyrdom, 35 RELIGION 1 (2005); Joshua J. Yates, The Resurgence offihad and
the Specter of Religious Populism, 27 SAIS REV. 127 (2007).
160 See infra Part III.B (discussing the argument for distinguishing between claims of con-
science on the basis of their harmful effects).
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science and religious beliefs under the First Amendment."161 Arguments
such as these have been uniformly rejected by courts, which refuse to
"equate a conscientious objection to taking lives with a conscientious
objection to paying a tax,"162 and find no basis for exemption from fed-
eral income taxes. 163 Notably, legislation to codify arguments such as
those made by the petitioners in Waitzkin has been proposed in Con-
gress for years, but has never passed. 164
Potentially, taxpayers could make similar arguments to avoid pay-
ing taxes that support any governmental programs or policies that they
conscientiously oppose, though such claims have not yet been tested in
the courts. 165 For example, much of the opposition to the 2010 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act focused on the possibility that fed-
eral funds might be used to pay for elective abortions. 166 While the law
161 Waitzkin v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 29 (T.C. 1981), affd, 697
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision). A statement attached to the petitioners'
tax return read:
The reasons for this decision were as follows (as also stated in our tax returns for
1973 and 1974). We cannot conscientiously pay income taxes which the United
States uses for war and related defense purposes. Howard Waitzkin is a conscientious
objector and has been so recognized by the Selective Service System. We believe that
payment of taxes for defense would violate our conscientious and religious beliefs
under the First Amendment. Furthermore, we adhere to the Nuremberg Principles
which establish that each citizen bears responsibility for illegal and/or immoral mili-
tary intervention policies of his/her government; we believe that the United States'
continuing military intervention in Indochina, Latin America, Africa, and other parts
of the world is both immoral and illegal under international law. Therefore, we are
reducing our income tax we pay by 50 percent approximately that portion of the
country's taxes which are spent on defense or war-related activities.
Id.
162 Linger v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1068 (T.C. 1981).
163 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) ("The tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a
manner that violates their religious belief."); Jenkins v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 483 F.3d
90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
taxpayer's argument that paying federal income taxes violates his pacifist beliefs); Wall v. Unit-
ed States, 756 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 663 (10th Cir.
1980) (rejecting taxpayer's argument for exemption from income tax based on the basis of a
"vow of poverty"); Waitzkin, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 29 (refusing to grant petitioner a conscientious
exemption from payment of taxes).
164 The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Bill, which would "enable conscientious objec-
tors to war to have their federal income taxes directed to a special fund which would be used for
non-military purposes alone," was first proposed in 1972, and continues to be sponsored on a
regular basis. Our Purpose, NAT'L CAMPAIGN FOR A PEACE TAX FUND, http://
www.peacetaxfund.org/aboutus/mission.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012); see Religious Freedom
Peace Tax Fund Act, H.R. 1191, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Waitzkin, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 29.
165 See generally Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REv. 317
(2011) (proposing a compelling interest test for accommodation of taxpayers' conscientious
beliefs).
166 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Abortion Fight Adds to Debate on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2009, at Al; Editorial, Abortion and Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at
A32.
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as passed expressly prohibits the use of federal premiums or cost-
sharing subsidies as payment for abortions excluded under the Hyde
Amendment,167 it is conceivable that, had the law excluded these provi-
sions, some taxpayers would have sought exemption from payment,
citing conscientious opposition to the use of their tax money for morally
prohibited purposes.
Finally, it is worth highlighting the substantial number of taxpayers
who subscribe to the "tax-honesty movement," known to the IRS and
Justice Department as "tax deniers" or "tax defiers."168 These groups
typically offer frivolous legal arguments for why they are not obligated
to pay income tax (for example, because the IRS is not an agency of the
United States, or because only federal employees are properly subject to
federal income taxes).169 However, some of their rhetoric is suggestive of
conscience-based claims-that is, despite all reason, logic, and legal ar-
gument to the contrary, they persist in making claims based on appar-
ently sincere beliefs about what they believe to be the true nature of
American tax law.170 Peter Hendrickson, a tax denier and author of
Cracking the Code: The Fascinating Truth About Taxation in America, a
handbook for the tax denier movement, has compared his feelings in
fighting the tax system to those of "Copernicus... when he was doing
his research."171 Moreover, when it comes to raising a legal defense for
their violation of tax laws, one lawyer who represents tax deniers "coun-
sels his clients to base their defense not on the rightness of their beliefs
but rather on the fact that they are sincere in them."172
4. Discriminatory Acts
Since the adoption of expansive anti-discrimination laws through-
out the United States, many have sought exemption from these laws on
the basis of conscientious belief.173 Conflicts most commonly arise in
167 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1303(b), 124 Stat.
119, 171 (2010).
168 Zengerle, supra note 153.
169 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX ARGUMENTS 29-31, 40-
41 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv-tax.pdf.
170 See Zengerle, supra note 153.
171 Id. In 1992, Hendrickson pled guilty in connection with mailing a firebomb to the IRS in
1990. Id. Since then, Hendrickson has been sued by the Justice Department for filing false tax
returns; he is currently being charged with ten counts of submitting false documents to the IRS.
Id.
172 Id.
173 Such claims are dependent on the content of the anti-discrimination laws: "I can, for
example, absolutely refuse to hire anyone whose eyebrows are not at least three inches long."
Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrirnination Protections for Gay People
Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 131 (2006).
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states and municipalities with laws that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity-for example, California,
which prohibits businesses from discriminating on the basis of, inter
alia, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation pursuant to
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.174 Numerous business owners in California
and elsewhere (including medical providers,175 websites,176 event ven-
ues,177 photographers,178 landlords,179 and civil servants8o) have refused
to provide services to gay couples on the basis of moral objections to
homosexuality.
Most of these conscience claims are brought as constitutional de-
fenses to suits alleging discrimination, arguing that enforcement of the
civil rights laws against the claimants violates their First Amendment
right to freedom of religion or expression. For the most part, courts
apply the test developed in Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission181 or some variation thereof, holding that the defendants
have no constitutional right to exemption from valid and neutral laws of
general applicability.182
In the face of such disappointments, some states have adopted leg-
islation explicitly providing for religious exemptions from civil rights
and discrimination laws.s3 New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecti-
cut, for example, protect clergy who do not want to participate in same-
sex marriages, and provide immunity from civil or criminal liability to
religious organizations that refuse to provide services related to mar-
riages that violate their religious beliefs. 184 These laws do not, however,
protect individuals or organizations with no religious affiliations who
174 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 2011).
175 See Ward v. Bd. of Control of E. Mich. Univ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 803 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(denying defendant university's motion for summary judgment in suit by counseling student
who was dismissed for refusing to counsel gays); N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San
Diego Cnty. Sup. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting medical group's claim to a First
Amendment defense for refusing to provide artificial insemination services to a lesbian couple).
176 See Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (denying
defendants' motion for summary judgment as to their claims under the Unruh Act); Carlson v.
eHarmony.com, No. BC371958, 2008 WL 7662906 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2008).
177 See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three-Act Story, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (June 16, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=91486340.
178 Willock v. Elane Photography, LLC, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Human Rights
Comm'n Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/btb/wp-content/uploads/
2008/04/elane.pdf.
179 See Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
180 See generally Wilson, supra note 41.
181 913 P.2d 909.
182 See, e.g., Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022; N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San
Diego Cnty. Sup. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 966-67 (Cal. 2008); Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685. But
see Ward v. Bd. of Control of E. Mich. Univ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 803 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
183 See Wilson, supra note 41.
184 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-22b (2011); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN, § 457:37 (2011); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4501 (2011).
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may nevertheless object to facilitating a same-sex marriage-including
florists, caterers, photographers, and wedding venues-and some schol-
ars have argued that the protections should be thus extended. 185
Some claimants have also relied on RFRA, albeit unsuccessfully, to
justify conscientious refusals to comply with anti-discrimination laws.
In Smith, for example, the claimant was a landlord who believed that
"sex outside of marriage is sinful, and that it is a sin for her to rent her
units to people who will engage in nonmarital sex on her property....
[I]f she does so, she will be prevented from meeting her deceased hus-
band in the hereafter."186 The California Supreme Court denied her
claim, holding that she had no right under RFRA to discriminate among
prospective tenants based on their marital status, because the anti-
discrimination laws did not substantially burden her freedom of reli-
gion. 187
In conclusion, although a few statutes exist to protect religious or-
ganizations and clergy from liability for violating anti-discrimination
laws, these laws do not extend to secular service providers with no for-
mal connection to a religious institution.188 And in most cases where
service providers have attempted to use RFRA as a defense to their dis-
criminatory actions, their claims have been unsuccessful.
5. Parents and Children
Conscience may also play a part in many choices that parents make
on behalf of their children.189 Parents who oppose education about pre-
marital sexual activity may seek to excuse their children from curricular
requirements in public schools.I90 Parents may seek conscience-based
exemptions from state vaccination laws, either because the relevant vac-
cines were developed in unethical ways,191 or because of ethical objec-
185 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 41; Robin Wilson, Protection for All in Same-Sex Marriage,
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at A39; Alan Brownstein, Op-Ed, Religious Freedom and Gay Marriage
Can Coexist, L.A. TIMES ONLINE (May 11, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/
opinionla/la-oew-brownsteinl 1-2009mayl 1,0,426780.story.
186 Smith, 913 P.2d at 912 (holding that a landlord has no constitutional or RFRA-based
right to discriminate against potential tenants on the basis of their marital status).
187 Id.
188 See Wilson, supra note 41, at 319-21.
189 Often, this arises in the context of a constitutional claim for free exercise of religion, as in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972). But a wide variety of cases, including those
discussed herein, fall within the sub-constitutional realm.
190 See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995).
191 See Edward J. Furton, Vaccines and the Right of Conscience, NAT'L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS
Q., Spring 2004, at 53, 53 (noting that parents "believe that it would be immoral to inoculate
their children with . . . a vaccine with even the most remote connection to abortion"). Vaccina-
tions with controversial origins include those for rubella, Hepatitis A, and varicella. Id.
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tions to the likely consequences of the vaccine. 192 Parents who refuse to
consent to medically necessary treatment for their children may also
seek to defend themselves from medical neglect charges by citing rea-
sons of conscience. 193 Parents who oppose animal cruelty and feed their
infants a vegan diet may pursue similar defenses when facing charges of
child abuse and endangerment.194 Parents with strong cultural beliefs
may ask physicians to assist in illegal practices that cause physical harm
to their children, such as female genital mutilation. 195
If, as is frequently the case, the parents in such cases are unable to
raise a successful free exercise claim (or a liberty claim under the Four-
teenth Amendment for the right to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren),196 they must instead rely on sub-constitutional methods of en-
forcing their rights of conscience,197 With varying degrees of success. In
the context of vaccination, for example, legislatures in twenty states
permit parents to opt their children out of vaccination on the basis of
nonreligious personal convictions.198 Moreover, many states have
adopted legislative exemptions to child endangerment and neglect stat-
utes that (in theory, at least) protect parents who rely on faith-based
192 See Michael Lindenberger, An STD Vaccine for All Girls?, TIME.COM (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1579707,00.html (discussing parental objec-
tions to proposed state legislation that would make the HPV vaccine mandatory for girls as
young as ten).
193 See Seth M. Asser & Rita Swan, Child Fatalities from Religion-Motivated Neglect, 101
PEDIATRICS 625 (1998).
194 See, e.g., Greg Bluestein, Vegans Sentenced for Starving Their Baby, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 9, 2007; Greg Retsinas, Couple Guilty of Assault in Vegan Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003,
at Dl.
195 See Wim Dekkers, Routine (Non-Religious) Neonatal Circumcision and Bodily Integrity: A
Transatlantic Dialogue, 19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 125 (2009).
196 "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are
free .. . to make martyrs of their children." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164, 170
(1944) (describing the parent's claim of a due process right "to bring up the child in the way he
should go, which for appellant means to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith").
197 See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106i(a) (2006) ("Noth-
ing in this subchapter ... shall be construed... as establishing a Federal requirement that a
parent or legal guardian provide a child any medical service or treatment against the religious
beliefs of the parent or legal guardian."). Most states have statutes granting religious exemp-
tions from child abuse and neglect statutes. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Perils of Privatized
Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MAR-
RIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 253, 258 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012);
Richard A. Hughes, The Death of Children by Faith-Based Medical Neglect, 20 J.L. & RELIGION
247, 248 (2004).
198 Nancy Berlinger, Conscience Clauses, Health Care Providers, and Parents, in FROM BIRTH
TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 35 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008), available at
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/BriefingBook/conscience%20cla
uses%20chapter.pdf. Of course, in the event of a true public health emergency, the parents'
right to refuse vaccination on behalf of their children would likely be curtailed. See Jacobson v.
Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Michael deCourcy Hinds, Judge Orders Measles Shots in Philadelphia,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at A23.
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healing rather than traditional medical treatment for their children. 199 In
practice, however, courts have tended to interpret these laws narrowly.
When parents are unwilling to provide life-saving medical treatment to
their children on religious or conscientious grounds, modern courts
have no compunction about ordering treatment against the parents'
wishes,200 or upholding manslaughter or homicide convictions if the
parents' beliefs cause a child's death.201 Similarly, vegan and vegetarian
parents whose diets lead to malnutrition in their children are routinely
punished regardless of the strength of their conscientious beliefs.202
At least one prominent health law and bioethics scholar has de-
scribed the law's treatment of such cases as "unprincipled" and
"inconsisten[t]."203 While there is little consistency in how the law treats
these various cases, a number of commentators have noted that when
the harm suffered by the child is likely to be severe, parental claims for
accommodation the basis of conscience are typically denied. In contrast,
where the child's condition is not life threatening, courts are often more
willing to defer to parental judgments.204
199 See Adam Lamparello, Taking God out of the Hospital: Requiring Parents to Seek Medical
Care for Their Children Regardless of Religious Belief, 6 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 47,48 (2001).
200 See Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as
Threshold for State Intervention, 25 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICs 243, 248-49 (2004); Kent
Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion Make a Difference?,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 808. But see Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1991)
(refusing to order chemotherapy for a child against his parents' wishes where the treatment was
invasive and had only a 40% success rate).
201 See, e.g., Walker v. Super. Ct., 763 P.2d 852, 866 (Cal. 1988) (holding that California faith
healing law does not provide a defense to prosecution for homicide or other felonies when
"serious physical harm or illness is .. . at risk"); Commonwealth v. Barnhardt, 497 A.2d 616,
619-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (upholding parents' conviction for involuntary manslaughter
when their child died as a result of an untreated tumor); see generally Lamparello, supra note
199, at 56-57; Wilson, The Perils of Privatized Marriage, supra note 197, at 260-61 (discussing
the 2008 Neumann case, in which a child's parents were convicted of second-degree homicide
for her death from a lack of insulin despite a Wisconsin law exempting parents who rely on
faith healing from child abuse charges).
202 See supra note 194.
203 Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine when Parents Should Make
Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000);
see also Diekema, supra note 200, at 245-46.
204 See Greenawalt, supra note 200, at 808; Diekema, supra note 200, at 245-46. The reluc-
tance of courts and legislatures to accommodate parents' conscientious claims on behalf of their
children is particularly surprising given that parents have a limited constitutional liberty right
to direct the upbringing of their children as they see fit. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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III. RAISING OUR CONSCIOUSNESS OF CONSCIENCE: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
After examining the various ways in which law responds to claims
for legal accommodation on the basis of conscientious belief, the reader
cannot be faulted for turning with a critical eye back to Part I.B's asser-
tion that liberty of conscience is a fundamental principle of American
society. Despite grand pronouncements by political philosophers,
founding fathers, and modern courts about the importance of respecting
personal conscience, the surprising fact remains that many claims of
conscience-whether framed as constitutional claims for religious liber-
ty or necessity defenses in criminal prosecutions-are unsuccessful. In
fact, claims by actors seeking legal relief on the basis of conscientious
belief have only met with regular success in the few contexts where there
are explicit statutory protections-when members of the military seek
exemptions from combat duty (though, notably, not when they use con-
science as a post hoc defense in criminal proceedings), and when medi-
cal providers seek relief from adverse employment actions on the basis
of their refusal to perform abortions or other controversial medical pro-
cedures. In most other situations, including civil disobedience, discrim-
ination, terrorism, tax evasion, and medical neglect, courts enforce
judgments against conscientious actors without hesitation. Rather than
reinforcing a view of conscience as fundamental to American law and
society, this assessment leaves the impression that legal accommoda-
tions for conscience are inconsistent and weak.
If the varied situations described in Part II are all woven through
with the common thread of conscience, then-at least as a prima facie
matter-they ought to be treated similarly.205 Of course, even the
strongest theory of accommodation of conscience has its limits.206 As a
result, it is incumbent upon the state to provide some explanation for
differential treatment-for example, by identifying relevant distinctions
between those cases in which law protects conscience and those in
which claims of conscience are rejected.
Judges adjudicating individual claims have, of course, offered rea-
soned justifications for drawing the lines where they do. In tax cases, for
example, they explain that the link between payment of taxes that sup-
port defense efforts and personal involvement in military combat is too
indirect to support an extension of legal accommodation. In cases of
205 See generally infra Part IV.
206 See Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 28, at 9-10 (noting that all principled
arguments for religious toleration necessarily recognize side constraints).
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violence and terrorism, judges point to the significant harms that are
caused by the defendants' actions, even when those actions are ground-
ed in sincerely held conscientious beliefs. In a variety of cases, judges
often point to the administrative burden of extending leniency to yet
another category of conscientious objectors.
But unfortunately, neither courts, nor legislators, nor legal scholars
have yet offered any consistent explanation as to why the lines of ac-
commodation for conscience are drawn where they are. That is, while
each of the various justifications described herein may help resolve indi-
vidual cases, no single justification offers an accurate descriptive ac-
count of law's treatment of conscience as a whole. If, for example, we try
to extend the directness justification highlighted in tax avoidance cases
to other situations (for example, instances of parental medical neglect),
the outcome of this analysis does not match up with the actual outcome
under our legal regime. If there is a content-neutral justification for
treating these cases differently, our legal system has thus far failed to
provide it.
Part III systematically examines the various justifications that have
been offered to explain the differential legal treatment of various claims
of conscience. Although each seems initially promising, none of these
justifications offers an accurate descriptive account of law's treatment of
conscience across various substantive realms.
A. Action v. Inaction
One justification for accommodating only certain claims of con-
science relates to the distinction between action and inaction. A person's
liberty is burdened most drastically, some argue, when the state compels
her to act against her will. In contrast, if the state merely prevents a per-
son from taking action, the burden on her liberty is not nearly as signifi-
cant. 207 Consequently, reasons of conscience may only be good excuses
for certain kinds of behavior-namely, omissions or failures to take
action that is legally required or expected. Military conscientious objec-
tors, for example, can obtain exemptions from a policy that would re-
quire them to engage in combat, an action that they view as morally
objectionable. Similarly, medical providers who oppose abortion on
conscientious grounds are permitted to avoid participation in acts that
might otherwise be expected of practitioners. In contrast, the law does
not protect those who engage in sit-ins, destroy property, or commit
violence. Under this reasoning, the distinction is justified because these
207 See, e.g., J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327,
361-64 (1969) (arguing that conscientious objections to performing positive duties should be
specially privileged).
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activists are not seeking to avoid compulsion by the state, but instead
are actively taking steps in direct violation of the law, and the state has a
right to prevent people from taking action that may be harmful to oth-
ers.
As a descriptive matter, however, the action/inaction distinction
does not explain why we grant legal accommodation for claims of con-
science in some cases but not others.208 To cite just one example, citizens
who refuse to pay taxes that support morally objectionable government
policies receive no accommodation, despite the fact that they are seeking
exemption from a positive action compelled by the state (payment of
taxes) in much the same way as military conscientious objectors, who
are exempted. Moreover, it is often difficult to draw a clear distinction
between passively refusing to take action compelled by the state and
actively taking steps to avoid complicity with objectionable government
policies. 209 For example, those who provide sanctuary to undocumented
immigrants may risk punishment under federal and state law-but is
their behavior best characterized as action or inaction? On the one
hand, sanctuary providers might be viewed as simply refusing to comply
with reporting requirements (inaction). On the other hand, they might
be viewed as actively sheltering undocumented immigrants on their
private property (action). If we cannot determine whether a believer's
behavior constitutes action or inaction, then it is especially difficult to
defend this account as a universal justification.
B. Harm to Others
A second account that might be offered to distinguish between
claims of conscience asks whether accommodating the claims is likely to
208 There are also a number of normative/philosophical objections to the action/inaction
distinction, which are beyond the scope of this Article. For example, many philosophers and
some legal scholars have suggested that the law's distinction between active and passive behav-
ior is merely semantic and not grounded in any real-world difference in motive or effect. See,
e.g., Ronald Dworkin et al., The Philosophers' Brief, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE
488-96 (Bonnie Steinbock et al. eds., 7th ed. 2009) (arguing that there is no legal distinction
between active physician-assisted suicide and passive withdrawal of treatment); see also Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that where
legislative intent is to prevent suicide, "it would seem .. . unreasonable to draw the line precise-
ly between action and inaction").
209 Similar arguments about the action/inaction distinction have been raised in the context
of Commerce Clause challenges to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA). Critics of PPACA argue that Congress lacks authority to mandate the purchase of
health insurance on the grounds that this would constitute inaction, rather than action, and
therefore that it does not fall within the Commerce Clause. Supporters of PPACA, in contrast,
argue that the law does indeed regulate action, namely the act of seeking medical care while
uninsured.
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cause harm to third parties.21o Martha Nussbaum, for example, describes
conscience as taking precedence over laws of general applicability only
"where public order and safety are not jeopardized."211 The first ques-
tion to be resolved in fleshing out this theory is what kind of harm is
relevant to the analysis: Harm to individual rights? Physical harm? Emo-
tional harm?
Considering those who hold conscientious objection to abortion
may be instructive in this regard. Providing legal protection (by way of
conscience clauses) to physicians who refuse to perform elective abor-
tions typically does not result in physical harm.212 Indeed, such laws
may even lessen the possibility of physical harm to a pregnant woman
and her fetus, if her physician's refusal to abort results in the continua-
tion of an uncomplicated pregnancy. On the other hand, providing legal
protection to Scott Roeder, who killed a physician who regularly provid-
ed abortion services, would likely promote physical harm in the form of
violence against abortion providers.213 It is for this reason, some might
argue, that the pro-life physician's choices are respected and those such
as Roeder's are not. Notably, this argument negates the significance of
the non-physical harm that may result to the pregnant woman from
respecting the physician's claim of conscience-emotional harm, mone-
tary harm (in that she is required to seek out the services of another
physician), and the burden upon her constitutionally protected liberty
interest in terminating a pregnancy. If we use this example as a guide,
we might conclude that law is willing to accommodate claims of con-
science only if the conscientious objector's action does not cause physi-
cal harm to a third party (even if it does cause other, less tangible
harms).
It is difficult to defend this theory as a descriptive account of law's
treatment of conscience. Much like physicians who object to performing
abortions, individuals who engage in non-violent civil disobedience,
sanctuary providers, and tax evaders also make claims of conscience
that, if accommodated, would not cause physical harm. Why, then, are
210 See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 28, at 318-19; Leiter, supra note 28, at 10-11.
211 NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 21.
212 Compare, for example, the physical harm that can occur to a woman if a medically neces-
sary abortion is not provided. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office,
Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs. Regarding the Denial of
Reproductive Health Care at Religious Hospitals (Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.
org/files/assets/EMTALA- ACLUCMSFollowUpLetter-StJoseph-_12-22-2010_FINAL.
pdf.
213 See Monica Davey, Abortion Foe Is Found Guilty of First-Degree Murder in Doctor's
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A12 (quoting an abortion opponent as saying, "People had
said if [Roeder] were acquitted it would be open season on doctors"); Larry Rohter, Protester
Guilty of Killing Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at A20 (quoting the president of the Fund for
a Feminist Majority as saying that a guilty verdict "will send a strong message" deterring abor-
tion opponents from further violence).
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their claims not respected? Surely, allowing individuals with strong con-
scientious beliefs to trespass peacefully on private property, shelter un-
documented immigrants, or refuse to pay taxes is not likely to cause
direct (or even indirect) physical harm. And the monetary and intangi-
ble harms they do cause seem no more troubling than the dignitary
harm suffered by a woman whose physician refuses to perform an elec-
tive abortion.
Moreover, as with the action/inaction justification, not all cases can
be neatly divided using the benchmark of physical harm. Military con-
scientious objectors, for example, seek accommodation from the gov-
ernment precisely because they want to prevent harm to third parties-
granting an exception means that neither the objector himself nor the
combatants he would otherwise be fighting will be injured or killed. On
the other hand, one might argue that even a single soldier's refusal to
fight in a war of great import is likely to result in an increased risk of
harm to his fellow soldiers, as well as an increased risk to the safety of
his countrymen. If we accept this argument, then granting combat ex-
emptions to military objectors would be problematic. Given these con-
siderations, it may be difficult to use the risk of physical harm as a unify-
ing standard for legal accommodation.
C. Directness of Ca usal Connection
A third account that might be offered to distinguish between
claims of conscience relates to the directness of the causal connection
between the claimant's belief system and her behavior-essentially, a
proximate cause analysis. Justice Cardozo made just such a distinction
in his concurring opinion in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of
California, which upheld a California requirement that university stu-
dents take an ROTC course in military training and tactics. Of this re-
quirement, Justice Cardozo noted: "Never in our history has the notion
been accepted .. . that acts thus indirectly related to service in the camp
or field are so tied to the practice of religion" as to warrant exemption
from state regulation.214
Courts routinely make similar arguments when defendants raise
the necessity defense for illegal actions taken on the basis of conscien-
tious belief. One of the elements of the necessity defense is a demonstra-
tion that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen a causal link
214 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 267 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concur-
ring). Were the doctrine of conscientious exemption so extended, Justice Cardozo wrote, its
scope would be carried to "lengths that have never yet been dreamed of," including exemption
of those who refuse to pay taxes that contribute to defense efforts. Id. at 268.
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between her own conduct and the harm she was seeking to avoid.215 In
upholding the conviction of a Vietnam protester who committed arson
at a local draft board building, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that a
defendant relying on the necessity defense must demonstrate "that a
direct causal relationship be reasonably anticipated to exist between the
defender's action and the avoidance of harm."216 The Court held that it
was unreasonable for the defendant to believe that setting fire to a draft
board file cabinet would prevent the harm with which he was con-
cerned-namely, the continuance of the Vietnam War.217
Much like the doctrine of proximate cause in tort law, a directness
analysis would tie liability (or, in these cases, the lack thereof) to the
existence of a causal nexus between the actions taken by a claimant, her
underlying conscientious beliefs, and the morally objectionable harms
she thereby sought to avoid. For example, while we might be willing to
accommodate a military objector whose moral qualms about killing
others prevent him from engaging in active combat, we would not ac-
commodate him if he objected to paying taxes supporting the war effort,
on account of the more distant causal relationship. Indeed, this is exact-
ly the sort of reasoning that many courts have used in denying claims
for exemption by conscientious objectors to taxation.218
However, despite its apparent logic, the directness model is simply
not consistent with the way American law actually draws distinctions
between various claims of conscience.219 Consider, for example, those
who are conscientiously opposed to abortion based on their belief that
killing innocent human beings, at any stage of life, is morally wrong.
Surely, the obstetrician who chooses not to provide abortions in her
practice can draw a direct link between her conduct and the result she is
seeking to avoid-she does not want to cause the death of an innocent
human being by performing a medical abortion. As described in Part
215 See generally Cohan, supra note 48, at 124-25.
216 United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1972).
217 Id.; see also United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting
necessity defense where defendants blocked entry to a nuclear weapons facility, on the grounds
that a reasonable person could not think "that blocking entry to [a nuclear weapons facility] for
one day would terminate the official policy of the United States government as to nuclear
weapons or nuclear power"); State v. Drummy, 557 A.2d 574 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (finding
necessity defense unavailable where defendants broke into Army recruiting office to protest war
in Nicaragua because there was no causal link between the break-in and the prevention of
atrocities allegedly being committed by the United States in Nicaragua).
218 See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
219 Some critics may also object to the directness model on normative/theoretical grounds,
using substantially the same arguments that have been used to challenge the validity of proxi-
mate cause as a tort law theory of causation. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1953). Further exploration of this debate is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. Given the general acceptance of proximate cause as a doctrine in tort law, however, it is safe
to assume that challenges to the doctrine in the context of conscience claims would be largely
unsuccessful.
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II.B, this physician will be protected under state and federal medical
conscience laws.
Now, consider what might happen if a patient, pregnant as a result
of rape, came to this same obstetrician to ask about her options. The
physician might counsel her patient against abortion or fail to discuss it
altogether;220 however, the patient might nevertheless choose to abort,
seeking out a different medical provider to provide the service. Even if
the physician were to explain to her patient that abortion, adoption, and
raising the child as one's own are all potential options, the patient might
still decide against abortion. These examples are intended to demon-
strate that, while the physician's explanation of options is one link in the
causal chain leading to the patient's decision, it is not the only link. And
yet, a physician who chooses not to speak to her patients about the pos-
sibility of abortion may be protected under state and federal conscience
laws.221 The lack of causation does not, unlike in military contexts, result
in a lack of legal protection.
Furthermore, consider a person who objects to abortion on the
same grounds as our hypothetical obstetrician-she believes that killing
innocent human beings, at any stage of development, is morally wrong.
Imagine, now, that this person has no qualms about killing in self-
defense or in defense of others (that is, killing a person who is a threat),
and that her conscience directs her to take one simple act that would
prevent hundreds of innocent deaths. Surely, killing a physician who
provides abortions will, as a causal matter, make it impossible for this
physician to perform abortions in the future. However, although the
causal link appears to be quite direct, our legal system does not grant
leniency in this case. 22 2
If we consider other examples of conscientious behavior, we see
similar inconsistencies. A sanctuary provider who shelters an undocu-
mented immigrant to prevent him from being deported is acting in a
way that, as a causal matter, will prevent the immigrant's deportation.
While he is not filing a petition for naturalization on behalf of the im-
migrant (the most direct option), his conduct is certainly a more direct
way of achieving his goals than, for example, bombing the immigration
office. A physician who refuses to perform in vitro fertilization on a
220 Some physicians, including recipients of Title X funding, may be prohibited from speak-
ing about abortion as a condition of federal funding. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
221 A number of state legislatures have proposed amendments to their conscience laws that
would explicitly protect medical providers who refuse to discuss abortion or refuse to refer
patients to another provider who might be willing to perform an abortion. See supra note 110.
222 See, e.g., Davey, supra note 213 (discussing Scott Roeder, who was convicted of the first-
degree murder of Dr. George R. Tiller despite his honest belief that deadly force was necessary
to prevent further murders); Rohter, supra note 213 (discussing Michael F. Griffin, who was
convicted of the first-degree murder of Dr. David Gunn despite claiming that he "acted in
God's name").
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lesbian because she opposes homosexuality on moral grounds and be-
lieves children should not be exposed to morally objectionable lifestyles
is acting in the most direct way she can to prevent this harm, and yet she
is unlikely to succeed if the patient brings a discrimination claim.223 In
conclusion, the directness of the causal connection between a conscien-
tious objector's action and the harm she is trying to prevent does not
accurately describe how the law differentiates between claims of con-
science.
D. Personal Versus Relational Exercises of Conscience
Another distinction we might call upon to justify differential
treatment is the distinction between personal and relational exercises of
conscience. Perhaps we are more willing to accommodate conscience
when it is exercised in a primary personal sense ("I need to maintain my
own moral integrity") rather than in a secondary relational sense ("I
need to act as a model for others and persuade them of the need for so-
cial change"). As noted in Part I.A.3, the actor in both cases is acting to
prevent what she considers to be a societal and moral harm. But in one
case she is ensuring only her own moral integrity, whereas in the other
she is ensuring her moral integrity by taking action that is aimed at im-
pacting others. Civil disobedience, for example, which by definition is
aimed at social change, may be viewed as a primarily relational exercise
of conscience. In contrast, military or medical conscientious objectors,
although they may agree that social change is necessary, are arguably
refraining from action primarily to ensure that they do not directly par-
ticipate in what they deem to be an unjust system.
This potential justification is subject to serious challenges because
it is often difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between primarily
personal and primarily relational actions.224 As Rob Vischer notes, con-
science always has elements of both, and there is no clear line between
223 See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Sup. Ct., 189 P.3d 959
(Cal. 2008) (rejecting medical group's claim to a First Amendment defense for refusing to
provide artificial insemination services to a lesbian couple in violation of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act).
224 Moreover, even if it were possible to distinguish between claims of conscience that have a
primarily personal component as opposed to those with a primarily relational component, it is
not clear which category should receive greater protection. Although traditional examples of
legal accommodations in religious, medical, and military contexts suggest that personal exercis-
es of conscience receive greater protection, critics may argue that it is a mistake to excuse peo-
ple who violate the law for what are essentially selfish purposes. As a comparison, consider the
common law defense of necessity, which requires a showing that the defendant acted to prevent
an objectively greater harm. If a defendant violates the law in order to avoid an alternative
harm that is worse only in her subjective opinion, she will not receive the benefit of the necessi-
ty defense.
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personal and relational exercises of conscience. 225 Given that an indi-
vidual's conscience may be formed relationally, even the most self-
directed exercises of conscience may have an inherently relational com-
ponent. For example, are those who bomb abortion clinics in order to
injure abortion providers aiming primarily at maintaining their own
moral integrity, or communicating a moral message to prevent others
from causing harm? Are business owners who refuse to serve gays acting
on their own religious motivations, or do they also hope that this ex-
pression of their beliefs will contribute to the social dialogue about the
moral acceptability of homosexuality? Moreover, few courts or legisla-
tures have explicitly relied on such an analysis to distinguish between
cases. For these reasons, it is impossible to defend the relational account
of conscience as an explanation for current legal doctrine.
E. Rehious Claims of Conscience
Another possible account of why we only grant some conscience-
based accommodations is based on the distinction between religious
and secular claims of conscience. Given that the Constitution explicitly
references a right to religious freedom (but not a right of freedom of
conscience more generally), perhaps the law's sub-constitutional treat-
ment of conscience also reflects this dichotomy. That is, perhaps courts
and legislatures are only willing to accommodate claims of conscience if
they are founded in religious belief.
As a descriptive matter, however, this model does not provide an
accurate illustration of the American law of conscience. While many
accommodations are expressly framed in terms of religious belief-for
example, the Selective Service Act's exemption for conscientious objec-
tion to war "by reason of religious training and belief'226-many are not.
Consider, for example, state vaccination laws, many of which permit
parents to opt their children out on the basis of philosophical, conscien-
tious, or otherwise secular personal convictions.227 Even the Selective
Service Act, while framed in explicitly religious terms, has been inter-
preted by courts to exempt those whose beliefs run the gamut between
philosophical and historical.228 In Watson v. Geren, for example, the
Second Circuit found no basis in fact to support the denial of an appli-
cation for military conscientious exemption that the Army described as
225 E-mail from Rob Vischer, supra note 134; E-mail from Rob Vischer to the author (Aug.
13, 2010) (on file with author).
226 See supra note 121.
227 See supra Part II.D.5.
228 See supra Part I.C.
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a "kitchen sink approach."229 According to DACORB, the application
was "punctuated throughout by block quotes from various figures that
seem to have little or no relevance to the subject of the application,"
including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, Jesus Christ,
Buddha, Krishna, the Dalai Lama and Lao-Tse, who the applicant col-
lectively described as "'heroes' it had taken him his entire life to discov-
er."230 Moreover, many claims of conscience that are explicitly grounded
in religious doctrine-for example, Catholic opposition to abortion,
when manifested as violence against abortion providers, or Islamic ter-
rorists' belief in jihad-are not granted legal accommodation.
More importantly, however, the religious account poses a signifi-
cant constitutional challenge. Exemptions from generally applicable
laws on the basis of religious belief alone might run afoul of constitu-
tional protections. Kent Greenawalt, for example, has argued that the
government ought to treat strong "non-religious moral claims" like reli-
gious claims, because treating them differently on the basis of a "theo-
logical premise or popular opinion that religious beliefs and actions are
more deserving than nonreligious views" might violate the Equal Pro-
tection clause.231 If we want to offer a principled legal distinction be-
tween those cases in which we accommodate conscience and those in
which we do not, the religious account seems unsatisfactory.
F. Balancing Tests
While courts frequently turn to theories including directness and
harm when resolving individual cases, perhaps it is a mistake to expect
any one of these theories to single-handedly resolve the full doctrinal
area of conscientious accommodation. Perhaps, rather than drawing a
clear line for accommodation based on blanket rules like whether a con-
scientious act causes physical harm, the test for legal accommodation of
conscience is more nuanced.
Consider, for example, the compelling interest test adopted for re-
ligious freedom cases under RFRA.232 According to the Supreme Court
in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unido do Vegetal, Congress
229 569 F.3d 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
230 Id.
231 Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1626, 1636. Greenawalt defends the position that "free exer-
cise demands certain exemptions but that nonestablishment, equal protection, and free speech
sometimes require extension to similarly situated nonreligious claimaints." Id. at 1642; see also
Feldblum, supra note 73, at 64 (arguing for recognition of "belief liberty" to protect religious or
secular beliefs that are central to a person's identity); Garnett, supra note 8, at 661 (arguing that
the no-establishment rule "protects the liberty of conscience primarily by respecting and pro-
tecting the independence of non-state authority").
232 See generally supra Part II.A.
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chose a compelling interest standard because it is "a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests."233 Among the government interests that might
justify uniform application of the law to religious objectors, the Court
noted, are the possibility of significant administrative harm (such as the
demise of the Social Security tax system).234 If granting an accommoda-
tion "would seriously compromise [the government's] ability to admin-
ister [a] program," the balance of interests will favor the state, rather
than the claimant, and the request for accommodation will be denied.235
At least one legal scholar has suggested that the protection of con-
science "has typically been understood to consist of some sort of rebut-
table presumption of non-interference with conscience, qualified by
something like a 'compelling state interest' limitation."236 However,
while balancing tests are commonly applied in RFRA cases, it is very
rare for courts or legislators considering claims of conscience to use
explicit balancing language when making decisions outside the context
of religious belief.237
Moreover, regardless of the language lawmakers actually use to jus-
tify their decisions, this kind of balancing test does not accurately de-
scribe positive law's treatment of conscience. First, the numerosity con-
siderations that are invariably weighed in cases of religious
accommodation are nowhere to be found in many conscience cases. In
O Centro, for example, the American branch of the church seeking an
exemption from the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) had only 130
members. The Court, while contrasting this with the "hundreds of thou-
sands of Native Americans" who use peyote for religious purposes, ul-
timately found for the church, concluding that granting an exemption in
either case would be unlikely to "undercut" the state's ability to enforce
the CSA more generally.238 In contrast, contemporary claims of con-
233 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2006)).
234 Id. at 435 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
235 Id.
236 Smith, supra note 6, at 916 n.22; see also Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Free-
dom, supra note 28, at 22 (arguing that the government should not be trusted as an arbiter of
moral disagreements that do not implicate a legitimate government interest); Schwartzman,
supra note 165 (proposing a compelling interest test for accommodation of taxpayers' conscien-
tious beliefs).
237 Cf State v. Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (evaluating defendant's
claim under the Freedom of Conscience Clause of the Minnesota Constitution pursuant to a
compelling interest test).
238 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirota Beneficente Unito do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433-35
(2006) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act with respect to religious use of a sacramental tea). Similarly, when the Supreme
Court in Yoder held that members of the Old Order Amish community could not be convicted
for violating Wisconsin's compulsory schooling laws, it noted that "probably few other reli-
gious groups or sects" would be able to make as convincing a showing as the Amish of the need
for an exception. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972).
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science rarely involve narrow exceptions for relatively small populations
of people. For example, the population of persons that maintain a con-
scientious opposition to abortion could potentially include many within
the Catholic and Orthodox Catholic faith, which encompass approxi-
mately 25% of the U.S. population.239 If a court or legislature were to
explicitly consider the effect of allowing up to 25% of all medical pro-
viders (including physicians, nurses, pharmacists, lab technicians, and
others) to abstain from participating in abortions, it is far from clear
that its conclusions would satisfy a balancing test akin to the one used in
First Amendment cases. 240
Second, even setting aside the size of the population seeking ac-
commodation, it is difficult to see how positive law's treatment of con-
science in its various iterations is consistent with a rigorous application
of a compelling interest or other balancing test. Consider, for example,
the law's imposition of civil or criminal liability when people trespass on
private property for reasons of social change, as in the case of peaceful
sit-ins. Would excusing such non-violent protesters from liability signif-
icantly hamper the state's interest in social order or enforcement of pri-
vate property rights? Reasonable minds could differ on this issue, but
considering the way the Supreme Court has evaluated recent RFRA cas-
es, it is difficult to imagine that excusing from punishment those few
non-violent trespassers with firmly held conscientious beliefs would
cause serious administrative difficulties.241 As another example, consider
the difference between granting exemptions from combat for military
objectors and granting exemptions for taxpayers who oppose war in
general. Congress and courts have long held that granting combat ex-
emptions for conscientious objectors is not likely to seriously hamper
239 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (2008),
available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
240 In eighteen states, fewer than ten doctors are available to provide abortions. Alexi A.
Wright & Ingrid T. Katz, Roe Versus Reality-Abortion and Women's Health, 355 NEW ENG. J.
MEDICINE 1, 2 (2006) (citing the Guttmacher Institute's 2002 Abortion Provider Survey). Some
states have adopted legislation in response to concerns about patient access in the context of
conscientious refusals. See Wilson, supra note 4, at 43 (noting a Massachussets law directing all
hospitals to provide emergency contraception to rape victims). Some believe that these con-
cerns about patient access are exaggerated. For instance, in The Limits of Conscience, Robin
Wilson offers, by way of example, two small towns in rural Virginia where patients do not have
problems accessing reproductive care. Id. at 52-53. She points out that many of the approxi-
mately 850 Planned Parenthood facilities throughout the country are in "rural and impover-
ished areas," and suggests that the evidence does not support claims of an "access crisis" in such
areas, but merely a crisis of convenience. Id. While the availability of Planned Parenthood and
similar clinics may significantly lessen the burden on patients seeking controversial reproduc-
tive care, it is certainly within the realm of reasonableness for a legislator or a court to deter-
mine that the government's interests in ensuring access to care outweigh the rights of medical
providers where the number of objecting medical providers is significant.
241 See WALZER, supra note 39, at 17 ("Indeed, there is very little evidence which suggests
that carefully limited, morally serious civil disobedience undermines the legal system or endan-
gers physical security.").
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the state's defense efforts-the number of objectors is limited, and the
Department of Defense (DOD) has established workable administrative
procedures for evaluating their claims. If this is the case, why should
exemption from payment of taxes on the basis of conscientious opposi-
tion to war be any different? If the percentage of objectors is the same
among the taxpaying population and the population of young men eli-
gible for the draft, then surely the IRS can establish administrative pro-
cedures similar to those used by DOD and enforce them at a propor-
tional cost, without wreaking havoc on our system of taxation as a
whole.
Different decisionmakers certainly may (and do) disagree with the
interpretations above.242 That being said, if courts or legislatures are
relying on balancing tests when making decisions about claims of con-
science, they are doing so neither explicitly nor consistently. According-
ly, it is difficult to defend the balancing approach as a descriptive model
of law's treatment of conscience.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF CONSISTENCY
Legal thinkers offer a variety of justifications to distinguish be-
tween claims of conscience that do receive protection in American law
and those that do not. Indeed, each theory may be reasonable and de-
fensible when applied to individual cases. However, none of these justi-
fications are generalizable enough to offer a satisfactory descriptive ac-
count of law's treatment of conscience as a whole.
The astute reader may, at this point, offer a challenge to this line of
inquiry.243 Perhaps it is a mistake to expect that any one of the justifica-
tory theories described in Part III will single-handedly explain the doc-
trinal morass of conscientious accommodation. In a similar context,
Kent Greenawalt offers a story of a couple's employment decisions over
the course of their lifetimes.244 At various points in time, their decision
to relocate is driven primarily by professional aspirations, child-rearing
goals, salary and prestige, or familial unity. But rarely do we see the
couple explicitly and calculatedly balancing each of these interests in the
course of making a decision. "This is how most people with opportuni-
ties go through life," Greenawalt asserts. "Yet we do not suppose they
242 See, e.g., Waitzkin v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 29 (T.C. 1981), affd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision) ("If every citizen could refuse to pay all or part of his
taxes because he disapproved of the government's use of the money, on religious grounds, the
ability of the government to function could be impaired or even destroyed.").
243 Thanks to Rob Vischer and Robin Fretwell Wilson for encouraging me to develop these
counter-arguments.
244 Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on
Some Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1136 (2010).
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are somehow incoherent or arbitrary in the way they make decisions,
though they have no system that either they or we as outsiders could
identify."245 Similarly, policy decisions are rarely made on the basis of a
systematic formula.
Of course, as Greenawalt recognizes, personal choices are clearly
distinguishable from judges' and legislators' decisions about public wel-
fare.246 In the policy realm, consistency and reliance on authoritative
precedent are significantly more important, our expectation being "that
these sources are capable of leading the broad range of decisionmakers
to the same results in the vast majority of instances."247 Accordingly,
when legal issues are at stake, our inclination is to identify specific
standards and tests that judges can apply across a wide variety of cases.
Even when they are "general and open-ended" (like the balancing anal-
yses used in First Amendment and other constitutional cases), the exist-
ence of identifiable tests reduces uncertainty and provides valuable
guidance to legal decisionmakers.248
While it may indeed be impossible to describe law's treatment of
conscience in terms of a single evaluative factor (like harm or proximate
cause), this challenge cannot be resolved by permitting decisionmakers
to pick and choose which factor deserves primary consideration in each
case. Allowing individual judges and policymakers to resolve legal
claims of conscience in the same way a couple makes employment deci-
sions will not result in the kind of doctrinal coherence that is necessary
to guide future decisions. At the very least, lawmakers ought to commit
to some identifiable standard, even if that standard balances a variety of
interests and may result in "uncertainty at the edges."249 The integrity
and continuity of our legal system deserves as much. Unfortunately, in
the context of conscientious accommodation (unlike First Amendment
protection), very few courts or legislators explicitly rely on a single
standard-no matter how imprecise.
This leads to a second possible objection to this Article's line of in-
quiry. Some readers may challenge the proposition that true respect for
conscience demands a more consistent mechanism for legal accommo-
dation than currently exists. It may be unrealistic or naive, they argue, to
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 1137.
248 Id. at 1137-38.
249 Id. at 1138, 1148 (arguing that "judges need simpler, more absolute principles and rules,"
even if those rules result in uncertainty). Such uncertainty and imprecision may, of course, lead
to partisan political decisions being made under the guise of legal principle. But having some
guiding principle, no matter how flexible, would be an improvement over the incoherent sys-
tem we have now. The "only plausible alternative to a balancing approach is to deny exemp-
tions across the board," and "those raising constitutional claims will certainly prefer occasional
uncertainty to rules that render their claims totally ineffective." Id. at 1149 (writing about the
free exercise clause).
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expect a body of diverse lawmakers-including judges, juries, and legis-
lators-to develop and consistently apply an overarching doctrinal theo-
ry for the treatment of conscience. Given that most conscience accom-
modations are granted by way of legislation and thus subject to
significant political pressures, perhaps it is folly to expect or demand
doctrinal coherence.250
I offer the following response to this critique. It may indeed be
somewhat naive to hope that legislators and judges resolving claims for
conscientious accommodation are consciously doing so on the basis of a
coherent legal theory that aligns with the common law. However, it is by
no means unreasonable to demand that they aspire to this. By way of
example, Congress's recent decision to require that each piece of legisla-
tion introduced in the House be accompanied by a statement explicitly
citing the constitutional authority on which it is based251 speaks to the
fact that many lawmakers do hope to legislate in a way that is consistent
with underlying legal doctrine, at least from a constitutional perspec-
tive.25 2 For similar reasons, when legislators or judges consider future
negotiations for conscientious accommodation, the justifications they
offer in support of their decisions ought to hang together in some rea-
sonably consistent way.
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that none of the justifications proposed in Part III
provide a satisfying account of positive law's treatment of claims of con-
science, it is nevertheless possible to reach some conclusions about this
area of law. First, as a descriptive matter, we can offer two alternatives to
the single-factor tests described in Part III. An evaluation of these alter-
natives, in turn, suggests normative goals for the jurisprudence of con-
250 Indeed, some may argue that it is a mistake to even consider the notion of "law's treat-
ment of conscience." Andrew Koppelman, for example, has written that "American law is not
aiming, clumsily, to protect conscience. It is doing something else." Andrew Koppelman, How
Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 961, 970 (2010).
251 David Weigel, Republicans Start Teaching Members How to Obey the Constitution, SLATE
(Dec. 20, 2010, 1:49 PM), available at http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/weigel/archive/2010/
12/20/republicans-start-teaching-members-how-to-obey-the-constitution.aspx (reproducing a
memo to members of the 112th Congress regarding a "New Constitutional Authority Require-
ment for Legislation").
252 Of course, in many situations, legislation may be adopted specifically because of dissatis-
faction with precedential common law or existing statutes, but these efforts do not derail the
argument for internal consistency. Just as the judicial principle of stare decisis allows for devia-
tion from existing precedent when the need for change is clear and consistent with current or
developing social norms, see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), so legislatures
and courts should not defer to existing laws if they have truly compelling reasons not to. But
when a legislature chooses to craft an exemption to generally applicable law on the basis of
conscientious belief, its reasoning ought to be defensible in other contexts as well.
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science. This Article concludes that only a content-neutral approach to
accommodation of conscience, such as a balancing of interests ap-
proach, is consistent with the principles of a pluralistic society that re-
spects the inherent value of conscience.
If none of the justifications set forth in Part III explain why law ac-
commodates conscience in some cases but not others, on what basis are
judges and legislators making their decisions? There are two likely ex-
planations. One possible interpretation of law's treatment of conscience
is as a balancing analysis writ large, as suggested in Part IV. In other
words, we might describe the law of conscience, though seemingly in-
consistent when viewed through the lens of individual cases, as con-
sistent with a balancing approach when viewed at a systemic level. That
is, while each individual decisionmaker may cite only one factor as driv-
ing her analysis-the distinction between action and inaction, personal
and relational motivations, or religious and secular claims; the degree of
harm; or causal proximity, for instance-the body of law taken as a
whole involves consideration of multiple factors, albeit without the ben-
efit of a single coherent or reproducible test. These factors include the
burden to the individual, the burden to the state, and the burden to so-
ciety that may result from the conscientious actor's conduct-all con-
tent-neutral considerations regularly weighed by judges and lawmakers
in other contexts. A similar approach can be found in freedom of speech
cases, in which the Supreme Court has held that states may impose rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions on public speech, but may
not regulate speech on the basis of its content.253 Perhaps in the context
of conscience, as well, legal decisions are based on the consequences of
an actor's conscientious belief, not its origins.
A second, somewhat less charitable interpretation might conclude
that there simply is no content-neutral explanation for why American
law treats claims of conscience as it does. One might reasonably con-
clude that when legal decisionmakers evaluate claims of conscience, they
do so on the basis of nothing more principled than judgments about the
merits of claimants' conscientious beliefs. On this account, whether law
ultimately provides accommodations for conscientious believers in a
particular context has little to do with principled considerations of
harm, causality, or administrative difficulty, and more to do with popu-
lar judgments about the validity of the claimant's beliefs and the reason-
ableness of her conduct in light of those beliefs. Courts and legislatures
253 See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 680 (1994) (holding that
strict scrutiny applies to "regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential bur-
dens upon speech because of its content"); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("[Albove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." (emphasis omit-
ted)).
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may be willing to grant conscience-based exemptions from generally
applicable laws only if societal consensus determines that the claimant's
underlying conscientious beliefs are objectively defensible and reflect
moral truths-or, at least, majoritarian values acting as a proxy for such
moral truths.254 That is, if a majority of Americans agree that a pharma-
cist ought not to be punished for refusing to fill an unmarried woman's
prescription for birth control in violation of her conscience, then that
agreement can be interpreted simply as a societal judgment that the
pharmacist's conscientious belief is correct (or, at the very least, correct
enough to be entitled to deference). Indeed, this interpretation is con-
sistent with the fact that most accommodations for claims of conscience
have been created legislatively, and that courts are generally reluctant to
provide relief in the absence of a legislative directive.255 Perhaps laws
like the Church Amendment and the Selective Service Act simply reflect
society's normative judgment about what constitute "good reasons" for
violating generally applicable law. On this account, freedom of con-
science cannot be considered a fundamental and universal theory driv-
ing decisionmaking in military, medical, religious, and other contexts-
rather, it is merely an appealing explanation used to justify individual
grants of conscientious accommodation in an ad hoc manner.
Readers may reasonably disagree as to which of these two descrip-
tive accounts is a more accurate interpretation of the American juris-
prudence of conscience. But as to which is the normatively preferable
approach when we are faced with future requests for conscientious pro-
tection-such as those by public and private service providers who op-
pose gay marriage, and by physicians and scientists with moral objec-
tions to new technology such as stem cell research and synthetic
biology-I believe the answer is clear. If the true purpose of providing
legal protection for claims of conscience is to respect personal beliefs
and protect them from oppressive majoritarian values, these claims
ought to be evaluated on a content-neutral basis.
254 See MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF
LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 119 (1973) ("Punishment is never imposed if the
court accepts the citizen's judgment.").
255 See generally supra Part II. Moreover, the content-based account may also help to explain
why actors with similar conscientious beliefs-for example, a physician and a layperson, each of
whom believes that abortion is unjustified murder-may be treated differently depending on
how they exercise those beliefs. That is, a physician who refuses to perform abortions is gener-
ally protected from legal repercussions, but the layperson who kills an abortion provider is
typically prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Under the content-based account, the differ-
ence in treatment can be justified on the grounds that the physician holds only one relevant
conscientious belief (that abortion is unjustified murder and thus morally wrong), while the
layperson also holds a second-namely, that murdering an abortion provider is morally justi-
fied. If both are correct with respect to the first belief, but the layperson is wrong with respect to
the second belief, then it would be appropriate to punish the layperson, but not the physician.
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An ad hoc approach that accommodates exercises of conscientious
beliefs only on the basis of popular judgments about the value of those
beliefs is problematic in two respects. First, while the ad hoc approach
may be a more accurate reflection of public consensus about morality, it
does not reflect the intrinsic value of respecting personal conscience.
Looking to the content of an actor's conscientious belief to determine
whether it is worthy of legal respect is simply inconsistent with the theo-
ry that conscience should be valued because of its inherent link to au-
tonomy, identity, and human flourishing. And it is this theory of intrin-
sic value that most legal scholars, philosophers, and judges typically rely
on when explaining why respect for conscience is so important in a plu-
ralistic society.256 From Thomas Aquinas257 to Roger Williams,258 a vari-
ety of thinkers have emphasized the value of respecting conscientious
beliefs, even when they are erroneous or deviate from objective truths.259
Modern scholars describe the value of conscience as existential in na-
ture,260 grounding it in the "dignity of the human person,"261 and citing
the close ties between conscience, identity, and personal integrity.262
Even the Supreme Court, which has recognized the exercise of conscien-
tious belief as valuable to a democratic community,263 describes such
choices as "central to personal dignity and autonomy."264 Of course,
some scholars and proponents of natural law theory may resist the au-
tonomy-based view of conscience, arguing that discussions of accom-
modation for conscientious belief ought not to be walled off from judg-
ments about objective morality.265 However, most contemporary legal
theory favors positive or interpretive (rather than natural) views of
law,266 and most modern descriptions of conscience as a normative ideal
for a liberal society describe it in content-neutral terms. In other words,
while there may be good reasons for a legal system to respect claims of
conscience, the validity of the moral principles underlying these claims
256 See generally supra Part I.B.
257 See VISCHER, supra note 6, at 58.
258 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 52.
259 See Hill, supra note 10, at 17 (describing Kant's theory as demanding respect for con-
science "even though [our moral judgments] are fallible").
260 Peter Fuss, Conscience, 74 ETHICS 111, 116 (1964); see also Greenawalt, supra note 5, at
47-48.
261 Garnett, supra note 8, at 672-73.
262 See generally VISCHER, supra note 6, at 64; Feldblum, supra note 73; Smith, supra note 6,
at 935-36.
263 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971).
264 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
265 See, e.g., VISCHER, supra note 6, at 23; Araujo, supra note 28, at 577 (describing legal
positivism as "human-worship," where the "'dominant prejudices of the moment,' rather than
some objective and moral compass ... guide[] society").
266 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
185-86 (2d ed. 1994) (describing legal positivism as rejecting the claim that "laws reproduce or
satisfy certain demands of morality").
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should be irrelevant. Accordingly, if making judgments about moral
truths-even if based on political consensus-is not law's job, then the
content-based justification for legal accommodation of conscience is
inadequate.
Second, adopting a content-based approach towards accommoda-
tion of conscience runs the risk of ossifying majoritarian beliefs and
oppressing minorities. This is precisely the risk that the principle of legal
respect for conscience-like the constitutional principles of religious
freedom and freedom of speech-is designed to prevent. Accepting an
objectivist or content-based view of freedom of conscience would sug-
gest that it is permissible for the government to favor certain viewpoints
over others without offering consistent policy reasons for its choices. If
we are comfortable favoring some claims of conscience over others for
reasons that have more to do with the state's interpretation of moral
truth than principles of public policy, there is little to prevent this atti-
tude from creeping into the state's treatment of religious belief.267 Such
an outcome would surely be objectionable to commentators on both
sides of the political spectrum. 268
Adopting the content-neutral approach to conscientious protection
offers us the opportunity to re-commit ourselves to the principle of
freedom of conscience by thinking more carefully about what, exactly,
this principle demands. Does liberty of conscience demand a presump-
tion that facially neutral laws are inapplicable to those with strong con-
scientious beliefs, or should conscientious actors be burdened with
demonstrating why they should be exempt? If we put the burden of
proof on the conscientious actors, what should they have to demon-
strate to make a successful case? Is a balancing analysis based on a com-
pelling interest standard sufficiently protective of state and individual
interests? Finally, of the various kinds of accommodations that law
could provide-complete immunity from legal consequences versus
immunity only from certain kinds of laws, for example269-which are
most appropriate? These questions and others are ones that legal schol-
ars have not yet had the opportunity to answer with respect to the broad
spectrum of potential conscientious claims described herein.
The principles of pluralism, liberalism, and escape from oppression
on which our country was founded should continue to be normative
goals in our jurisprudence. That is, while we cannot submit to the folly
of moral relativism, our society ought to continue to foster and respect
diversity of belief and opinion. In the realm of conscientious accommo-
267 See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 6 (discussing lessening of protections for religious
equality in connection with the increased prominence of evangelical Christianity).
268 Perhaps it is time to return to the words of Mahatma Gandhi: "In matters of conscience,
the law of the majority has no place."
269 See GREENAWALT, supra note 28, at 318-21.
[Vol. 33:41448
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1448 2011-2012
2012] HOLLOW PROMISE 1449
dation, the best way to do this is by requiring lawmakers to provide ro-
bust and content-neutral reasons for accommodating some exercises of
conscientious belief but not others. Alternatively, if we are comfortable
granting ad hoc exceptions based on the content of an actor's conscien-
tious belief, we ought to concede that the promise of freedom of con-
science, so often heralded as a fundamental feature of American law and
society, is a hollow one.
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